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Changing the Law, Changing the Culture:
Rethinking the "Sleepy Resident" Problem
Jennifer F. Whetsell*
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Residents live in the cracks of a broken health care system
They get things done. But what we badly need is a system
that has many more elements of safety built into it." 1
...

Teaching hospitals, medical residents (doctors-in-training),
and patients have long engaged in a very rewarding three-way
quid pro quo. Teaching hospitals provide valuable training to
both upcoming physicians and the medical schools that teach
those physicians. Residents provide inexpensive and eager services to those hospitals, their attending physicians, or senior
staff, and the patients for whom they care. In residency utopia,
residents and attending physicians exist in a nurturing masterapprentice relationship under which the residents' medical skills
thrive, and patients receive excellent care. 2 Patients often
choose teaching hospitals for their "top physicians, research and
technology, and lower mortality rates in areas such as heart bypass surgery."3
* Clerk to Honorable Eric L. Clay, Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. New
York University, J.D., 2002. I would like to thank Professor Sylvia A. Law for her
thoughtful input during the preparation of this Article, as well as her encouragement
and assistance in seeking publication of it. I also thank my family for their continued
support during my educational and professional pursuits.
1. Sandra G. Boodman, Waking Up to the Problem of Fatigue Among Medical
Interns, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2001, at S1 (quoting David C. Leach, executive director
of Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education).
2. Anne Barnard, Teaching Hospitals' Dilemma: Instruction vs. Care for Harried
Residents, Duties Not Clear-Cut, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 10, 2001, at B1.
3. Id. It is not clear how much the quality differential between teaching and nonteaching hospitals still holds true. After World War II, academic physicians trained
medical specialists and sub-specialists at record rates (exceeding the needs of teaching
hospitals), and many of those specialists began working at community hospitals.
Thus, "patients in the suburbs no longer necessarily need to go to teaching hospitals
for specialty care; many services formerly available only at teaching hospitals can be
obtained at many community hospitals as well." KENNETH M. LUDMERER, LEARNING TO HEAL: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN MEDICAL EDUCATION 269 (1985).
Moreover, although patients are attracted to teaching hospitals for these perceived
benefits, the actual medical services they receive can vary depending on, among other
things, socioeconomic status. For instance, residents and interns are more likely to
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However, there is increasing evidence that this quid pro quo
has been hampered by hospital traditions of long hours and little
supervision for residents, including interns (medical school graduates in their first year of residency). These training programs
mandate 36-hour work shifts, 100-plus hour workweeks, and frequent overnight duty.4 These stringent standards come at the
expense of patients, whose care frequently suffers under these
circumstances, even to the point of injury or death.
While not all teaching hospitals engage in such exploitation
tactics, enough did so as to invoke concern from many corners,
not the least of which were patients. After the tragic death of a
patient in 1984, 5 New York enacted a set of regulations setting
work hour limitations and minimum supervision requirements
for hospitals in the state.6 And now a federal bill, modeled after
the New York law, is being considered to regulate residents'
work hours on a national scale.7
This Article explores the debate surrounding the "sleepy resident" problem. It considers the New York experience to address whether and how the federal government should take a
similar approach. It analyzes the efficacy of the New York statute and demonstrates that its directives are widely flouted in
hospitals across that state. The Article argues that New York's
mandate fails to take sufficient account of hospital cultural and
financial issues and therefore fails. A better approach would be
to adopt programs that promote positive actions and cross-cultural collaboration 8 to fix problems, not initiatives that assign
serve lower-income patients who have no attending physician, rather than wealthier
ones who do. See WILLIAM G. ROTHSTEIN, AMERICAN MEDICAL SCHOOLS AND THE
PRACTICE OF MEDICINE: A HISTORY 215-16 (1987) ("In dealing with ward patients
without personal physicians, house officers have been given a great deal of discretion.
This has seldom benefited the patient. Because house officers rotate among the hospital services, the residents who care for individual patients change regularly ... Residents have been relatively unskilled providers of patient care [and] have used their
patient care activities primarily for self education..."); cf ANDREW D. HUNT, MEDICAL EDUCATION, ACCREDITATION AND THE NATION'S HEALTH: REFLECTIONS OF AN
ATYPICAL DEAN 8 (1991) (noting that the poor must use local health department as

affordable alternative to private practice physicians with admitting privileges).
4. Barnard, supra note 2.
5. For more discussion of the patient, Libby Zion, and the related case, see infra
Part II.B.1.
6. See infra Part III.B.1 and notes 67-69, and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part III.C.3.
8. Such collaboration, ideally, would occur internally (i.e., between senior doctors
and junior doctors) and externally (between the medical community, legislators, and
concerned citizens). This Article elaborates on the idea of collaborative efforts infra
Part V.A.
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blame and issue orders. The Article then sets a proposed framework for a model the federal government should use to establish
a system that not only changes the law, but also the culture.
II. BACKGROUND

A.

The Typical Residency and Internship Programs

The average student graduating from medical school has an
M.D. degree, and a set of basic skills sufficient to practice
medicine. Yet he or she lacks the complex and multi-faceted
skills and knowledge to practice medicine on a day-to-day basis,
much less at the specialist level.9 This is particularly true in the
usually fast-paced atmosphere of a typical hospital, where decisions must be made quickly and efficiently. As such, residents
are "physicians in transition." 10
Clinical training officially begins during the third and fourth
years of the medical school curriculum, after students have completed two years of intensive study of basic medical science.11
However, many authorities question the overall efficacy of these
clinical experiences. These last two years are
generally composed of a series of required clerkships in the
major clinical disciplines in the third year followed by a series
of largely elective experiences in the fourth year. In virtually
all cases, the educational design of the clerkship and elective
experiences consisted solely of assigning students to teams
composed of resident physicians and an attending physician .... [T]he focus of clinical education was on the care of
seriously ill, hospitalized patients .... [The idea is] that students [can] learn what they need[ ] to know by observing resident and attending physicians in action in inpatient settings
and by doing whatever they were asked to do.1 z
It became apparent that, despite the overwhelming load of
course work and clinical duties assigned to the medical students,
9. Stewart R. Reuter, ProfessionalLiability in PostgraduateMedical Education, 15
J. LEGAL MED. 485 (1994).

10. Id.
11. Most medical schools do offer some limited clinical education in the first two
years, in the form of "longitudinal preceptorships that placed students in the offices of
primary care physicians for one half day per week" in order to expose students to
"more ambulatory care-based experiences." Michael E. Whitcomb, Responsive Curriculum Reform: Continuing Challenges, in THE EDUCATION OF MEDICAL STUDENTS:
TEN STORIES OF CURRICULUM CHANGE (2000) (Report of Milbank Memorial Fund

& Association of American Medical Colleges), available at http://www.milbank.org/
aamc/0010aamc.html.
12. Reuter, supra note 9, at 485.
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the four-year program could provide only a rudimentary medical education. With the continuing proliferation of biomedical
information, a medical school education no longer sufficed, even
with a jam-packed curriculum. An ever-growing amount of
13
postgraduate instruction became necessary.
Therefore, most states require at least one year of clinical
training, known most commonly as a "residency," or "postgraduate education," before granting an unlimited license to practice
medicine. 14 As such, the medical community frequently characterizes the first year of residency as an additional year of medical school, "in which the resident acquires additional knowledge
and begins to make independent medical decisions."15
A typical hospital residency lasts four years, but can potentially last from three to seven years.16 Some residencies start
with one year of rotation during which the resident spends time
in various specialties, such as surgery, obstetrics, and pediatrics,
for a wider breadth of medical knowledge. Although the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education
(ACGME), a private professional organization, regulates much
of the postgraduate clinical training through its accreditation
13. Reuter, supra note 9, at 485. It is worth noting that this view of the medical
residency's necessity to practice medicine capably is not without its critics. In fact,
many scholars not only vigorously dispute the necessity of lengthy residencies, but
also argue that such residency programs have negatively impacted overall medical
care in the United States. See, e.g., LUDMERER, supra note 3, at 270 "[t]here has been
an ongoing tension between the need to provide students an adequate corpus of
knowledge and technique and the equally important need to have students finish
training at a reasonable age. In theory, one could study medicine forever; in practice,
a physician at some point must enter the field. With the relentless growth of knowledge, the former has scored every major victory while the latter has suffered every
corresponding defeat."
For instance, many argue that the current movement toward long residency programs has created a significant dearth of eligible doctors to practice in underserved
areas of this country, particularly in rural and lower-income urban areas. See RAND
E. ROSENBLATr ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 531-33,
539-41 (1997);

COUNCIL ON GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION, PHYSICIAN DISTRIBUTION AND HEALTH CARE CHALLENGES IN RURAL AND INNER CITY AREAS
TENTH
REPORT TO CONGRESS AND THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
SECRETARY 1, (1998), available at http://www.cogme.gov/10.pdf. A number of medical schools are starting to address the problem by developing special incentive programs. See Howard K. Rubinowitz et al., Critical Factorsfor Designing Programs to
Increase the Supply and Retention of Rural Primary CarePhysicians, 286 JAMA 1041
(2001) (noting seven such U.S. medical school programs).
14. Reuter, supra note 9, at 485 (citing Cal. Bus. & Prof'l Code § 2065(b) (Deering 1986); Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-207(c)(2002); 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 163.1(a)(6)
(West 2002); see also ROSENBLATr ET AL., supra note 13, at 528-29.
15. Reuter, supra note 9, at 485-86.
16. Id.
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process, 17 the rotation year remains largely unregulated and its
training content is left to the discretion of the teaching hospital
or supervising medical school. 18 If a rotation year is not required, the resident will commence immediately in his or her
19 The first year is then called the
selected specialty department.
"categorical year. ' 20 In either case, a first-year resident is commonly called an intern.
There is no uniform model of a residency program, particularly because the various programs are run by the separate specialty departments, rather than either the medical school or the
teaching hospital.2 1 Generally, residents start clinical training by
working mostly in patient care. From the first to third years,
they increasingly allocate their time among more, non-patient
care activities, such as assuming some of the teaching duties of
the faculty members. ' 22 At the completion of the multi-year
residency, the resident usually becomes certified in that particular specialty by a nationally recognized private medical specialty
17. Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, at http://
www.acgme.org [hereinafter ACGME](describing its role and explaining the accreditation process). For a list of accredited programs, see id. at http://www.acgme.org/
adspublic. Among the accreditation standards are guidelines for resident duty hours
that vary somewhat by department, but are all considered voluntary (e.g., "Residents
must not be assigned in-house call more often than every third night."). See Report of
the ACGME Work Group on Resident Duty Hours, June 11, 2002, at http://
www.acgme.org/new/dutyhrequirem.pdf. The ACGME, despite periodic inspections
of residency programs (every one to five years), has determined that "a significant
proportion of hospitals across the U.S. have failed to meet [the work hour guidelines]." ACGME Highlights Its Standards on Resident Duty Hours - May 2001, at
http://www.acgme.org. A number of the AMA's recently adopted policies ask the
ACGME to enforce compliance with these and other guidelines. See C. Blair Harkness, AMA Adopts Policies Regarding Medical Education, 283 JAMA 740 (2000)
(describing papers). For more on accreditation standards, see infra note 26 and accompanying text.
18. Reuter, supra note 9, at 486.
19. The immediate commencement into specialties and sub-specialties has not escaped criticism. Until the 1960s, most students spent the last two years of medical
school and the internship year in clinical training, for a total of three years. Since
then, however, the elective system (which allows students to concentrate in a particular area of medicine) has converted the final year of medical school into a year of
specialty training, and the internship, which exposed students to a broad range of
medical departments, has been abandoned in favor of the first year of residency (normally with concentration on the specialty), leaving only the third year of medical
school for clinical training in general medicine. "The effects of these changes have
been so unsatisfactory that the AMA Council on Medical Education .. .recommended in 1982 that the [first year of residency] should consist of a broad year of
general training." ROTHSTEIN, supra note 3, at 318.
20. Reuter, supra note 9, at 486.
21. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 3, at 322.
22. Id. at 319.
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board, normally by completing a qualifying examination and
meeting other specified requirements. 23 Although board certification is technically voluntary, it frequently is a de facto requirement to practice medicine in a hospital, to participate in a
managed care organization (through which doctors acquire
many patients), and to demonstrate qualifications to prospective
patients. 4
The ACGME accredits residency programs for a particular
number of years. As part of its policy, the ACGME has set
forth a number of requirements for accredited teaching hospitals, including that they provide "adequate supervision for all
residents, duty hour schedules that are consistent with proper
patient care, systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of the
teaching program, regular evaluation of residents' performance,
and adequate numbers of teaching staff with appropriate qualifi' 26
cations to instruct and supervise the residents in the program.
In the ideal residency, the postgraduate student learns how to
treat patients under close supervision from an attending practitioner or medical school faculty member, while gaining "graduated, progressive responsibility" with each passing year of the
residency, as required by the ACGME.27 Meanwhile, a more
senior doctor is available for consultation in cases of uncertainty.28 In the case of interns, while senior residents often are
the primary supervisors and are on call to assist with any of the
interns' questions, attending physicians are also available for
consultation.29 Medical schools and teaching hospitals provide
reciprocal benefits: the teaching hospitals furnish the setting for
substantial medical student education and training, and medical
schools in turn supply young, board-certified physicians at rela23. Reuter, supra note 9, at 486. The qualifications differ based on the individual
specialty board, but have gravitated, in recent years, toward favoring written examinations over direct observation of physicians' work or reviewing patient files. For
more information on board certification, see the website of the American Board of
Medical Specialties (ABMS), which is the umbrella organization for the twenty-four
approved American medical specialty boards, at http://www.abms.org.
24. See Janice Robertson, Tips on Board Certification and Recertification, 282
JAMA 1882 (1999).
25. Reuter, supra note 9, at 487; see ACGME, supra note 17.
26. Reuter, supra note 9, at 486. While the ACGME provides broad residency
program accreditation, separate Residency Review Committees within the ACGME
establish minimum requirements for specific specialties' residency programs. Id. at
486-87.
27. Id. at 487.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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tively low cost to the hospital, 30 as well as the
faculty to educate
31
and train these up-and-coming physicians.
Unfortunately, since many of the nation's residency programs
do not operate under this ideal system, current practice unnecessarily compromises the welfare of thousands of patients per
year. These problems are discussed next.
B.

Sleepy Residents, Inadequate Supervision, and Insufficient
Ancillary Staff

There are three main, interrelated problems existing in most
American residency programs today. First, residents work too
many hours, leading to sleep deprivation. Second, supervision is
inadequate, often based on "trial by fire" type hazing. Third,
ancillary staff is often inadequate.
LONG HOURS AND SLEEP DEPRIVATION. Of the three
problems, the long, grueling hours of the typical residency program is probably the greatest complaint. Part of the classic residency-training program is the practice of assigning residents to
overnight calls (i.e., the resident must be available to care for
patients all night). Ironically, the original purpose of the overnight call was educational, because many illnesses emerged during the night. This, in itself, does not represent a problem, as
hospitals will always need doctors during night hours, and the
original intent of scheduling doctors-in-training to the night shift
(i.e., to train residents during the hours when most illnesses
evolve) is legitimate. The problem is that hospitals require
residents to work both the day and night shifts consecutively,
without any breaks. Often, shifts last up to thirty-six hours. Indeed, the overnight on-call duty occurs several times a week for
many residents, seriously disrupting their sleep patterns, as they
usually are only able to sneak in a few (cumulative) hours of
sleep while on call.33
30. The average salary for a resident nationwide in 2000-2001 was about $39,000.
See The McGaw Resident and Fellow Forum, Resident Salary Analysis, at http://
www.mrff.org/salary (last visited Jan. 28, 2002); see also infra note 135 and accompanying text (listing starting resident salary, .
31. Reuter, supra note 9, at 488.
32. Alice A. Kuo, Does Sleep Deprivation Impair Cognitive and Motor Performance as Much as Alcohol Intoxication?, 174 W. J. MED. 180 (2001).
33. See, e.g., American Medical Student Association, Support H.R. 3236 Limiting
Resident-Physician Work Hours (2001), at http://www.amsa.org/hp/rwhfact.cfm [hereinafter AMSA].
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Providing residents with one day off per week to recover from
the draconian schedule (and the lost sleep) might ameliorate
such an arrangement. But the typical resident does not enjoy
this luxury. In fact, residents may work 100 hours or more per
week (125 hours per week is not an atypical rite of passage),34
with no day off for more than a month. The following schedule
of a first-year internal medicine resident represents one variation on a typical week of training:
Saturday /Sunday:Worked 36 straight hours.
Monday: Worked from 6 A.M. to 9 P.M.
Tuesday: Worked from 6 A.M. to midnight
Wednesday: Worked from 6 A.M. to 3:30 A.M. the next day
Thursday: Worked from 6 A.M. to 9 P.M.
35
Friday: Worked from 6 A.M. to 7:30 P.M.

Indeed, John Ronches, MD, executive director of the Committee of Interns and Residents, characterized the typical teaching
hospital as one in which "people work[ ] shifts reminiscent of a
19th-Century sweat shop and completely illegal in almost all
36
other jobs.
The grueling schedule is particularly problematic because
overly fatigued physicians are more likely to make mistakes:
People fall asleep according to biological laws and have
been doing so since prehistoric times - often while at work.
When people try to work without adequate sleep, dangerous
impairment occurs . . .Often, because [residents] have not
slept, they are in a dull mental state. Yet they perform surgery
and treat patients. Think of it - an auto crash victim may undergo brain surgery by a resident who has not slept for the last
60 hours.37
34.

Esther B. Fein, Flouting Law, Hospitals Overwork Novice Doctors, N.Y.
Dec. 14, 1997, at 1.
35. Id. Note that this schedule, in addition to tallying up to 118.5 hours, requires
some consecutive day and night shifts by scheduling the resident to 36 consecutive
hours on duty. Ironically, this resident worked in a Manhattan hospital, which, according to the Bell Regulations promulgated 10 years prior, was supposed to limit his
schedule to 80-hour weeks, 24-hour shifts, and a day off per week. This schedule, as
reported by the resident, violates the Bell Regulations in these three crucial respects.
For more discussion of the Bell Regulations, and their frequent violations, see discussion infra Parts III.B and V.A.
36. John Ronches, Must We Squanderthe Legacy of Libby Zion?, NEWSDAY, Jan.
3, 1995, at A24.
37. Merill M. Mitler & Mindy B. Cetel, Why the Doctor May FallAsleep on Your
Case, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1989, at 5.
TIMES,
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In one 1991 study, forty-one percent of residents stated that
the most serious mistake they made within the last year was due
to exhaustion.38 One of the most common causes of physician
impairment is lack of sleep. 39 A study conducted by the California Board of Medical Quality Assurance reported knowledge of
negative impacts on patient care, due to long work shifts, in seventy-five percent of cases.4 °
"Negative impact" is an ambiguous term. The horror stories
have varied, but they all share the common trait of being horrible. Residents - even surgical residents - have reported experiences of falling asleep directly on their patients while providing
medical care.4 ' Other residents report that, while they do not
make serious judgment errors, they "miss things" they otherwise
might have noticed in a more rested state. 42 "At best, tired physicians lack the energy for thorough and compassionate care; at
worst, they commit serious errors while impaired by sleep deprivation. '43 One family practitioner-in-training posed the problem well by commenting that, "It's crazy what goes on ....
Patients would be horrified if they knew how long some of us
were awake for. You just can't function properly after a
while."44
LACK OF SUPERVISION. Compounding the sleepy resident
problem are complaints about general lack of adequate supervision by attending physicians for residents. The ideal vision of
the medical residency includes a close, mentor-apprentice type
relationship between an attending physician and a resident.45
However, it seems that in most residency programs the attending physician is absent from resident training. Instead, more senior residents train their junior colleagues,46 and interns are
most closely supervised by second-year residents who "are as
38. See A.W. Wu et al., Do House Officers Learn from Their Mistakes?, 265
JAMA 2089, 2091 (1991).
39. Id.
40. Mitler & Cetel, supra note 37.
41. Id. at 5; see also Ann Japenga, Endless Days and Sleepless Nights: Do Long
Work Schedules Help or Hinder Medical Residents?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1988, at 1
(describing resident who fell asleep while delivering prognosis negative to patient and
describing resident who, while "stitching up a patient after a Caesarean delivery
pitche[d] face forward in a state of exhaustion").
42. Fein, supra note 34.
43. Mitler & Cetel, supra note 37.
44. David Abel, Bill Eyes Guidelines, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 10, 2001, at B1.
45. See supra note 2, and accompanying text.
46.

ROTHSTEIN, supra note 3, at 319.
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sleep-deprived and overburdened as interns and have only one
47
additional year of experience.

Many researchers have concluded that "[t]he combination of
inexperience, stress, and poor supervision result in a significant
48
number of negligent acts by house staff.

The following anecdote epitomizes the typical concern about
related risks to inadequate senior doctor supervision. The intern returned home after her first experience in the neonatal intensive-care unit (NICU), and related the night's events to her
spouse:
For most of the night, [the intern said] she had been the sole
physician in charge of thirty-five pre-term babies attached to
intravenous tubes, ventilators, and monitors. Half were under
thirty weeks old . . . "Around two [a.m.], I had two babies

crash on me," she said bitterly, taking a deep breath as she
recalled the long night. "One was septic, and the other was
turning blue. I had no idea what to do. They gave me no
training, no explanations about how to run the ventilators or
how to mix and adjust the intravenous fluids. If the nurses
hadn't been really good, we would have lost one." "But where
were the [attending physicians]?" [the intern's spouse asked]
"Home." She explained that a third-year resident was theoretically on call to help her but had been gone most of the night,
assigned to cover labor and delivery as well as the NICU.
"You're telling me you were alone running the entire NICU a first-year resident?" [the spouse asked the intern.] "It's their
version of hell night," she said icily, "the first night on call on a
new rotation, when they leave us alone, basically
to sink or
'49
swim. They call it learning stress management.

Many senior doctors and medical school faculty members believe that the best learning occurs by assuming responsibility. 50
However, "the proficiency of residents still in training has remained legally and professionally suspect until their competence
has been demonstrated by board certification.

' 51

Moreover,

one would think that the logic that increased responsibility
would rest upon an actual correlation between the amount of
supervision and the years of experience under a resident's belt.
47. Boodman, supra note 1.
48. Reuter, supra note 9, at 489.
49. David E. Duncan, Is This Any Way to Train a Doctor? Medical Residencies:
The Next Health-Care Crisis, HARPER'S MAG., Apr. 1993, at 61.
50. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 3, at 319.
51. Id.
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33

But this assumption has not borne out-consistent with the
"hazing" story presented above, an Institute of Medicine study
found that residents acted with supervision at the same frequency (40 percent of the time) regardless of whether the resident was in the first, second, or third year.5 2 Finally, this
independent responsibility may lead to errors. A 1983 study of
209 patients examined by twelve residents found errors in the
examinations of about 60 percent of the patients. The researchers observed that "the errors were not minor and that their correction frequently led to major changes in differential diagnosis
and therapy. '53 The issue is so critical that some experts feel it
is an even larger problem, and a more potent contributing factor
to medical errors than the sleep deprivation issue.54
ANCILLARY STAFF. A third problem involves teaching hospitals' persistent under-funding of (and in some cases, cutbacks
on) non-medical ancillary staff, who provide other important
tasks, such as drawing blood, delivering and retrieving ex-rays,
transporting patients, and arranging patients' housing.55 When
an inadequate number of ancillary staff workers are available,
their duties, which physicians commonly (though somewhat derisively) refer to as "scut work," fall to already overworked residents, who say that such important, though ancillary, duties
"do not contribute to their medical training. "56 Of course, these
tasks keep residents away from their primary task-treating patients. One 1993 study observed internal medicine house staff
and reported that the interns and residents therein spent "[a]
significant amount of time each day ...

performing non-physi-

cian duties" and in contrast spent "little time" evaluating pa52. Id. at 275-76.
53. Id. at 319 (citing Nelda P. Wray & Joan A. Friedland, Detection and Correction of House Staff Errors in Physical Diagnosis,249 JAMA 1035, 1037 (1983)).
54. Bertrand Bell, founder of New York's Bell Regulations, adhered to this position, and paid more emphasis to adequate supervision than to work hours in drafting
the Regulations. Boodman, supra note 1.
55. Id.; Fein, supra note 34 (noting that problem was expected to worsen in face of
more cutbacks of ancillary staff).
56. Japenga, supra note 41. Despite the unfortunate pejorative it suggests, the
term "scut work" is widely used among practitioners, even those writing in medical
journals and other scholarly papers. See, e.g., Eric J. Casell, HistoricalPerspective of
Medical Residency Training: 50 Years of Changes, 281 JAMA 1231 (1999); Lynne
Lamberg, Long Hours, Little Sleep: Bad Medicine for Physicians-in-Training, 287
JAMA 303, 305 (2002); Richard Moulton, Duty, Trust, and the Training of Residents,
49 J. TRAUMA 575, 577 (2000). This Article's use of the term "scut work" here is
designed only to adopt the name it seems to have inherited. It should be emphasized,
though, that although ancillary work has taken on this term, "scut work" is a necessary element to a well-functioning hospital environment.
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tients or with patients' families.5 7 Residents echo the
implications of this finding. One third-year internal medicine
resident, when interviewed, noted that she "could triple the
number of patients she sees in a clinic setting if she had adequate ancillary help to fill out requisitions, schedule appointments, transport patients, and perform other such tasks."58
Researchers and commentators alike have called for a reduction
in residents' performance of non-physician duties. 59
1.

The Libby Zion Case
Of all the stories attributing patient safety failure to the
problems inherent in American residencies, perhaps none has
left a stronger legacy than the Libby Zion case. Libby Zion was
an 18-year-old college freshman who arrived at the emergency
room of New York Hospital at around 11:00 p.m. on March 4,
1984, with a 102 degree fever, an earache, "severe shaking,
chills, and agitation. 60 She was admitted and thereafter assigned to a doctor already in charge of forty other patients. She
had informed the emergency workers that she had been taking
Nardil, an anti-depressant. With this information, but misunderstanding Libby's infection, an intern, halfway through a thirtysix-hour shift, prescribed an injection of Demerol, which had
long been known to be fatal when taken in conjunction with
Nardil. 6 1 Subsequently, Libby's temperature climbed to 108 degrees, yet the intern failed to return to check on Libby. 62 Indeed, no one looked at her after 3:30 a.m., and at 7:30 a.m. she
died of cardiac arrest, only eight hours after having been admit57. See Connie Parenti & Nicole Lurie, Are Things Different in the Light of Day?
A Time Study of Internal Medicine House Staff Days, 94 Am. J. Med. 654 (1993); see
also AMSA, supra note 33 ("Surveys show that between 30% and 40% of a resident's
time is spent on non-educational activities").
58. Japenga, supra note 41.
59. Faith T. Fitzgerald, The Case for Internal Medicine, 328 N. ENG. J. MED. 654,
656 (1993); See, e.g., Parenti & Luri, supra note 57, at 658.
60. Daniel Wise, "Slow and Steady" Approach by Bensel Seen Key to Verdict, N.Y.
L.J., Feb. 8, 1995, at 1 [hereinafter Wise, Slow and Steady].
61. Mary Mclver et al., Staying Alert on the Intern Shift, MACLEAN'S, Dec. 14,
1987, at 04. Indeed, according to plaintiffs' attorney in the ensuing lawsuit, the Physician Desk Reference, considered the bible of medicine, had warned doctors for 17
years not to mix Nardil and Demerol, because otherwise they "can kill" their patients.
Daniel Wise, Lawyers Sum Up 11-Week Zion Wrongful Death Trial, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 1,
1995, at 1 [hereinafter Wise, Lawyers Sum Up]; see also Michael D. Johnson et al.,
Clinically Significant Drug Interactions,POSTGRADUATE MED., Feb. 1999, at 193 (noting that "this known, preventable drug interaction [between Nardil and Demerol] has
been very well documented").
62. Wise, Lawyers Sum Up, supra note 61; Wise, Slow and Steady, supra note 60.
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ted. 63 Her untimely death might have been no more than a footnote in hospital records if it had not been for her father, exprosecutor and journalist Sidney Zion, who launched a crusade
to change the hospital system. Charging that his daughter's illness was misdiagnosed and mistreated due to the resident's exhaustion, inexperience, and lack of supervision, he filed a
medical malpractice lawsuit against four doctors and, most notably, New York Hospital, for what he deemed its medically negligent residency program.64 New York Hospital denied the
allegations, 65 and after an acrimonious trial in 1995,66 the jury
found that the actions of two of New York Hospital's residents
caused Libby's death and held the Hospital liable. Unfortunately, as the Zions' attorney explained, the jury "failed to return
with a finding of institutional negligence, a condemnation of the
system, or an award for punitive67 damages, all of which were important goals for the plaintiff.
Despite the disappointing civil trial result, Libby's legacy ultimately was grounded through legislative means. Wanting to
change the institutional practices that he believed caused his
daughter's death, Sidney Zion had also urged, and received, a
63. Wise, Lawyers Sum Up, supra note 61; Wise, Slow and Steady, supra note 60.
64. Andrew Blum, A Father's Crusade Finally Gets to Court, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 12,
1994, at A12.
65. Id.
66. Thomas A. Moore, plaintiff's attorney, had strong language for the defendants
throughout the trial. In his opening statement, he announced that Libby's death "resulted from a 'litany of errors' committed by the hospital, as well as from flaws in the
system's training, which he claimed sent out residents who were 'inexperienced, unsupervised, overworked and sleep-deprived."' Blum, supra note 64. New York Hospital, having apparently discovered trace amounts of cocaine in Libby's system upon
her autopsy, responded that the cocaine use, which was not disclosed to the residents,
was the true cause, arguing that the residents would have chosen a different course of
treatment had they known of the cocaine's presence. Id. Plaintiffs denied any cocaine use and accused New York Hospital of fabricating the discovery to ease itself off
the hook for its own negligence. Early sparrings included the permissible extent of
the cocaine defense, and both sides' expert witnesses endured blistering cross-examinations. Id. In closing arguments the defense attorney admonished the jury not to
trust plaintiffs' attorney's courtroom antics and speeches. Wise, Lawyers Sum Up,
supra note 61.
67. Thomas A. Moore & Matthew Gaier, InstitutionalNegligence and the "Libby
Zion Rules", N.Y. L.J., Jan. 6, 1998, at 3. The jury accepted both plaintiff's and defendants' theories, assessing the doctors and Libby 50% liability each for $750,000
worth of pain and suffering. Wise, Slow and Steady, supra note 60. On plaintiff's
motion, Justice Wilk set aside the jury's cocaine finding, but then granted a remittitur
to the defense, leaving the $375,000 ultimate award in place. Daniel Wise, Judge
Rules out Cocaine Defense in Zion Opinion, NEW YoRK L.J., May 2, 1995, at 1 [hereinafter Wise, Judge Rules]. The parties thereafter settled out of court for this amount.
Smaller Wins: Honorable Mention Defense Victories, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 4, 1996, at A25.
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grand jury investigation into the practices and medical residency
program of New York Hospital. Although the grand jury did
not return a single indictment against New York Hospital or any
of its physicians, it did issue a report in which it concluded that
Libby's death "was due to an undiagnosed but treatable infection missed because of inadequate medical supervision and resident fatigue. ' 68 The grand jury noted that Libby received
"woefully inadequate" care, detailed each individual doctor's
mistakes, and "criticized the hospital for failing to assure adequate supervision of junior physicians. "69
New York's response to the grand jury report in 1987 was to
create an Ad Hoc Advisory Committee, chaired by Dr. Bertrand Bell, professor of Einstein Medical College, Yeshiva University. The committee designed a set of regulations that was
passed as amendments to the New York State Health Code in
1989. They became known as the Bell Regulations, and their
purpose was to regulate residents' work hours and supervision
of their patient care. v° These regulations are discussed in further
detail later.7 '
2.

Complaints from Other Patients

The Libby Zion tragedy, unsurprisingly, is not unique. A
number of deaths and near-fatalities have been attributed to the
errors of fatigued, inexperienced, and unsupervised residents for
years. In 1999, five-and-a-half month old William Katcher, unbeknownst to the residents providing his care, was suffering
from a severe infection. William was not provided a breathing
tube until one of Boston's Children's Hospital's senior doctors,
while on his rounds, noticed the infant struggling to breathe and
came to his rescue. Taking over the care of William, senior doctors placed him in intensive care, where he was put on a respirator and eventually recovered. His mother recalled that two of
the residents responsible for his care approached her, near tears,
saying, "We're so sorry. We didn't know how sick he was." His
mother then complained to the hospital's chief executive, who
promised her that the hospital would improve supervision. 2
68. Mitler & Cetel, supra note 37.
69. Michael Orey, Zion Update: Troubles for NY Hospital, AM.
1987, at 9.
70. Moore & Gaier, supra note 67; Ronches, supra note 36.
71. See infra Part III.B.
72. Barnard, supra note 2.
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But the following year, thirteen-month-old Taylor McCormack died after residents at Children's Hospital, without advice
from a senior doctor, underestimated her need for medical attention. Instead, they postponed her surgery and placed her in a
non-intensive-care room. While state health officials ruled that
Taylor should have been placed in the intensive care unit, it is
notable that the residents could not reach the atterding doctor,
because he had fallen asleep with his pager on a vibrate-only
setting. This occurred despite the fact that Children's Hospital
has been praised as "a leader in error prevention '7 3 , and the fact
that many Massachusetts hospitals have adopted stringent resident supervision policies. 4 The problem is not restricted to
Children's Hospital by any means. A spokesperson for the Massachusetts' Department of Public Health has acknowledged the
problem, citing that most, if not all, hospitals in the state have
overly inadequate resident supervision.
The mishaps, of course, are not restricted to pediatrics units.
Another infamous case occurred in 1987, when a Nevada man
was seriously injured when residents administered an injection
of potassium at the proper dose, but at an incorrect rate - rapid,
instead of slow. "This happened because the on-call resident
was awakened briefly from a sound sleep76 and gave an incorrect
order that to this day he cannot recall.
These anecdotes represent only a few examples of mistakes
where the cause, or at least a major contributing factor, was inadequate rest and/or supervision for residents treating patients,
and these stories are by no means isolated.
3. Complaints from Residents
It is clear that the universe of sleep-deprivation-induced iatrogenic errors is much larger than the previous subsection suggests, when you consider that most errors are never publicly
known.77 Many residents acknowledge that the grueling work
schedule and lack of supervisory and ancillary support routinely
73. Id.
74. Id. Newton-Wellesley Hospital is a good example; it adopted one of the strictest set of supervision policies after Massachusetts cited it for the iatrogenic deaths of
two mothers in 1997. Id.
75. Id. ("We have probably cited every teaching hospital in the state at one time
or another over supervision of residents." (statement of Roseanne Pawelec, spokeswoman for Massachusetts Department of Public Health)).
76. Mitler & Cetel, supra note 37.
77. This is because mandatory reporting laws do not exist in the United States.
See infra Part II.B.4.
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affect their judgment negatively. 78 Indeed, as mentioned earlier, 79 one 1991 survey found that forty-one percent of residents
cited fatigue as a cause of their most serious error, and in nearly
one-third of these incidents the patient died as a result. 80
Not surprisingly, residents and interns live in constant fear of
adverse consequences to their patients.8 ' The following nearmiss stories shared by residents are characteristic of the
problem:
At 3 a.m., intern Michael Greger, awakened for the fifth
time that night, listened as a nurse ticked off a long list of
blood test results for one of his patients, then fell back into an
exhausted stupor. Later in the morning, when he checked the
patient's chart, Greger was horrified: He had failed to realize
that one of the blood tests clearly showed that the man was in
imminent danger of having a fatal arrhythmia, a heart rhythm
disturbance. The patient was rushed into intensive care.
It was 2 a.m., anesthesiology resident Steven K. Howard had
been working for more than 16 hours and was facing another
hectic, sleepless night in the operating room. After preparing
two syringes containing drugs for his next patient, Howard had
a vague feeling something was amiss. He checked the syringes
and discovered that one contained the wrong drug, a medication that would have triggered a fatal stroke.
Plastic-surgery resident Risa S. Moriarty had been working
for more than 50 hours without sleep when she started to perform complicated colon surgery. Minutes after the nine-hour
procedure began, Moriarty briefly nodded off, instruments in
her hand. After her repeated attempts to stay awake failed, a
sympathetic senior surgeon sent her home.82
The brutal 100-plus-hour workweeks and thirty to forty-hour
shifts negatively impact the physicians-in-training as well, both
in the short- and long-term. Stories of automobile accidents on
78. Fein, supra note 34 (quoting first-year resident who commented that, because
of fatigue, "[y]ou tend to miss things. You let things fall through that cracks that can
come back to bite you" and that "[t]he way it hurts most.., is that you end up making
decisions factoring in what's easiest for you, what won't bog you down and keep you
there longer").
79. See supra Part II.B.
80. See Wu et al., supra note 38, at 2089-92; see also Michael J. Green et al., Do
Actions Reported by Physicians in Training Conflict with Consensus Guidelines on
Ethics?, 156 ARC. INTERN. MED. 298, 303 (1996) (reporting survey results that residents attributed ethical errors to exhaustion and overwork).
81. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 44 (describing a resident who "routinely works 36hour shifts, and worries that the lack of sleep impairs her judgment and risks the
safety of her patients").
82. Boodman, supra note 1.
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the way home from hospital shifts are common,83 and depression and suicidal tendencies are much higher for residents than
for other professionals in training.84 Some students ultimately
abandoned their training for this reason, or out of fear of injuring patients.85 Others who make it through are never the same;
emotionally they are colder and less responsive toward patients
and colleagues.86
4.

Empirical Evidence of the Medical Mistakes and
Fatigue Problem

The personal accounts described above are increasingly supported by studies on the effects of sleep deprivation, both generally and pertaining to medical residents. As a starting point, the
fact that medical errors occur is almost undeniable. The Institute of Medicine (IOM), an arm of the National Academy of
Sciences, issued a report in 1999 in which it estimated that as
many as 98,000 hospitalized patients die each year as a result of
83. John Ronches, supra note 36 (noting that every year a "New York resident
dies in a traffic accident as a result of post-work shift fatigue"); see Michael Hochman
et al., Limit the Work Hours of Medical Residents, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 13, 2001, at
A19 ("Emergency room residents are seven times more likely to have a motor vehicle
accident due to falling asleep at the wheel during their residency than before it.").
84. Duncan, supra note 49, at 61 (discussing how "residencies had brutalized people we knew, breaking up two marriages involving close friends, driving two others to
contemplate suicide, and leading yet another to become addicted to a narcotic that he
said got him through long nights on call" and describing how his wife, while in residency, "lost interest in food, exercise, the kids, me, and everything else she loved" and
was "becoming frustrated and disillusioned over why she had become a doctor"); see
Hochman et al., supra note 83 (noting that residents working in excess of eighty hours
per week are "at considerably increased risk for depression").
85. Duncan, supra note 49, at 61 (discussing how his wife became so burned-out
from her residency that she, as well as others, took leave of absence); see, e.g., Abel,
supra note 44 (describing resident who abandoned seven years of surgical resident
"after dozing off in the operating room during a 60-hour shift without sleep" and
commented that she "definitely wasn't the only one falling asleep on the job").
86. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 44 (describing a resident who started "resenting
patients who interrupt her late-night attempts to nap"). This strikes a sharp, and
ironic, contrast to the current trend of medical schools to include classes on ethics,
compassion, and other "humanistic" courses in the curriculum. Milo Tedstrom, a retired internist and 1924 graduate of Washington University School of Medicine, commented that no such classes were offered 75 years ago, but doctors instead learned
those things "while we rounded with attending [physicians] and residents." Robert
Lowes, Labs, Lectures, and Sleepless Nights, MED. ECON., Oct. 19, 1998, at 136. Yet
the close master-apprentice relationship has dissipated, thanks to lack of proper supervision, and medical graduates are exhausted beyond capability of providing a decedent bedside manner. Therefore, medical schools' stated desire to "select students
who have compassion and see that they retain it," id. at 141, seems somewhat
disingenuous.
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medical errors, with many of them preventable, and most of
them unreported. 7
Moreover, there are several interlinking reasons to believe
that resident fatigue is a significant contributing factor in many
of these deaths and other threats to patient safety. First, because residents and interns are given primary responsibility for
most patients in teaching hospitals, they make the most errors in
patient treatment. 88 Second, the effects of sleep deprivation on
performance and its compromise on safety has already been
demonstrated and accepted as scientific fact in many other areas, including aerospace, aviation, and transportation. Indeed,
safety researchers, sleep experts and a growing number of influential physicians ...

point to numerous studies conducted

since 1980 in transportation, at NASA, and elsewhere that
clearly demonstrate that sleep deprivation causes errors.
These studies consistently show that fatigue erodes every aspect of performance: judgment, vigilance, mood, motor coordination, cognitive skills, reaction time, and even the ability to
recognize error.8 9
Response to these studies led to regulations, under which "airline pilots are barred from flying more than eight hours a day,
truck drivers are limited to [ten] consecutive hours behind the
wheel, and rest breaks are mandatory for air traffic
controllers." 90
Third, there is some documentation in the medical field that
sleep deprivation in residents leads to mistakes. Studies have
been consistent in demonstrating "that mood, attitude, and per87. See Linda Kohn et al., To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System,
(Nov. 1999), availableat http://stills.nap.edu/html/toerrishuman/. The report was published in book form shortly thereafter. See LINDA T. KOHN ET AL., To ERR IS
HUMAN:

BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM

(2000). Although the controversial

report generated a lengthy debate about the accuracy of these findings, see, e.g.,
Troyen A. Brennan, The Institute of Medicine Report on Medical Errors - Could It Do
Harm?, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1123 (2000) (challenging the classification process in
calculating 98,000 "errors"), they certainly also generated a lot of commentary and
public reaction, both at the state and federal legislative levels. These reactions are
discussed supra at text accompanying note 82.
88. Typically the interns are given the most responsibility for patient care, and
"are most closely supervised by second-year residents who are as sleep-deprived and
overburdened as interns and have only one additional year of experience." Boodman,
supra note 1 (quoting Bertrand M. Bell). As such, "[m]istakes by interns and residents kill more people than medication errors." Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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ceived efficiency deteriorate with sleep loss.''91 Whether sleep
deprivation causes cognitive deficiencies has been more vigorously debated. One authority on sleep deprivation "cited 22
studies showing that sleep deprivation leads to 'difficulty with
cognition and reasoning,' as well as 'almost stereotypical emotion hazards: anger, paranoia, an inability to recognize when errors are made."' 92 Another study found that, "[w]hen compared
with their own performance[s] when rested, sleep-deprived
house officers did poorly on tests of recognition of electrocardiographic patterns,93 on tests of memory, language, numeric,
and anesthesiology skills,94 and they had more psychological
problems. ' 95 Another study suggested that surgeons suffer from
cognitive and motor skill lapses, which certainly could endanger
whoever is on the table during a period of the surgeon's inadequate rest. 96 Moreover, a particularly eye-opening 2000 study
found that the performance of participants with 17-19 hours of
sleep deprivation was equivalent to or worse than a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.05%, and participants suffering
from 19-28 hours of sleep deprivation performed at a BAC of
0.10%, suggesting significant cognitive impairment.97 Medical
researcher Alice Kuo recently cited this study as definitive evidence that sleep deprivation negatively affects residents' job
91. C.H.M. Jacques et al., The Effects of Sleep Loss on Cognitive Performance of
Resident Physicians,30 J. FAM. PRAC. 223 (1990) (citing C.V. Ford & D.K. Wentz, The
Internship Year: A Study of Sleep, Mood States, and PsychophysiologicalParameters,
77 S. MED. J. 1435, 1435-42 (1984); Richard C. Friedman et al., Psychological
Problems Associated with Sleep Deprivation in Interns, 48 J. MED. EDUC. 436, 436-41
(1973); R.P. Hart et al., Effect of Sleep Deprivation During on First-Year Residents'
Response Times, Memory and Mood, 62 J. MED. EDUC. 940, 940-42 (1987)).
92. Japenga, supra note 41.
93. A. Jay Block, Revisiting the Libby Zion Case, 105 CHEST 977 (1994) (citing
Richard C. Friedman et al., The Intern and Sleep Loss, 285 N. ENG. J. MED. 201, 20103 (1971)).
94. Id. (citing Michael R. Hawkins et al., Sleep and Nutritional Deprivation and
Performance of House Officers, 60 J. MED. Enuc. 530, 530-35 (1985); Richard A.
Denisco et al., The Effect of Fatigue on the Performance of a Simulated Anesthetic
Monitoring Task, 3 J. CLIN. MONIT. 22, 22-24 (1987)).
95. Block, supra note 93 (citing Friedman et al., supra note 91, at 436-41).
96. See N. J. Taffinder et al., Objective Assessment of the Effect of Sleep Deprivation on Surgical Psychomotor Skill, 85 BRIT. J. SURGERY 1578, 1579 (1998) (suggesting, based on empirical study, that sleep deprivation increased stress, which in
turn impaired subjects' psychomotor performance on simulated surgical tasks).
97. A.M. Williamson & Anne-Marie Feyer, Moderate Sleep DeprivationProduces
Impairments in Cognitive and Motor Performance Equivalent to Legally Prescribed
Levels of Alcohol Intoxication, 57 OccuP. ENV'T MED. 649, 649-55 (2000). The authors also reported much slower (up to 50%) response times for 17-19 hour sleepdeprived subjects than for control subjects with a 0.05% BAC, and accuracy measures
were poorer. Id. at 649.
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performance and urged "the commitment of faculty, residency
directors, and governing organizations to make a change. "98
On the other hand, a number of studies have not found statistically significant results regarding the actual performance of
sleep-deprived residents. 99 For example, a study examining the
effects of sleep deprivation on surgical residents found no significant change in incidence of complications when residents were
sleep deprived. 1°° So, it is fair to say that the results are mixed.
C.H.M. Jacques and colleagues have suggested that the lack of
consistency in results "reflect the generally small numbers of residents studied, the inconsistent definition of sleep loss, and the
wide variety of tests used to measure performance." 10 1 At the
least, there is strong evidence - in addition to common sense suggesting that a sleepy resident is an unqualified resident, and,
at the very least, more research with strong empirical designs
0 2
should be developed to confirm this hypothesis.
Despite this, the medical community has largely dismissed the
studies by exhibiting wide-scale skepticism toward their scientific basis. 10 3 Even the IOM report "barely mentioned fatigue as
a factor in mistakes made by the nation's 100,000 interns and
residents.' 01 4 When asked why, a member of the panel that prepared the report contended that insufficient "rigorous scientific
evidence" has supported a causal relationship between fatigue
0 5
and medical errors.
There are some legitimate roadblocks to definitively attaining
that causal relationship. First of all, only about five percent of
98. Kuo, supra note 32, at 180.
99. Jacques et al., supra note 91, at 223 ("Reports on measures of performance,
however, have not been consistent.").
100. See Richard K. Reznick & J. Roland Folse, Effect of Sleep Deprivationon the
Performanceof SurgicalResidents, 154 AM. J. SURGERY 520, 520-25 (1987). However,
the design study has been criticized by some because "the long work hours and everyother-night call schedule of the study groups may have resulted in evaluating two
more or less equally exhausted populations." Jacques et al., supra note 91, at 228.
101. Jacques et al., supra note 91, at 224.
102. See, e.g., id. at 228 ("Better studies need to be designed specifically to separate the effects of acute and chronic sleep deprivation on performance, especially
when determining the effects of sleep loss on performance in residency programs in
which long hours and frequent calls are common.").
103. Boodman, supra note 1 ("There have never been good studies that show
damage or injury to patients that result from sleep loss by doctors .... You can have
just as much disaster occur after having had a full night's sleep." (quoting Richard
Reiling, of American College of Surgeons at the American Medical Association)).
104. Id.
105. Id.
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medical errors are ever reported, °6 which means that 95% of
medical errors are never investigated. Even within that fivepercent, it is difficult to pinpoint any one cause when investigating medical errors. In fact, it has been suggested that this is
partly why medicine lags behind other high-risk industries, such
as aviation, in sleep deprivation research. "Medical mistakes
are frequently complex and the consequences less obvious than,
say, failure to de-ice an airplane. '' 10 7 As one former internist
(now medical writer) commented, "It's much harder to pin a
problem on the fact that a resident didn't get enough sleep ....
It's not like when a 747 crashes and the evidence is right there
on the runway. "108
Quite possibly, the underlying reason for the lack of rigorous
research may be politically motivated. Medicine may not want
to know if sleep deprivation causes errors. 10 9 After all, the topic
of resident fatigue is extremely sensitive. As Stephen K. Howard, associate professor of anesthesiology at Stanford University, commented, "Medicine is the only high-hazard industry
that has successfully ignored this issue."110 There are a number
of reasons that the medical establishment may wish to avoid
finding a smoking gun, as is discussed in the next subsection.
5.

The Medical Establishment's Defenses of the
Traditional Residency

Generally, older doctors, primarily those who have "been
there" and lived to tell about it, do not lend sympathetic ears to
the complaints of residents. 1 There are a number of reasons
why hospitals and seniors doctors defend the typical residency
program. There are also some generally unspoken, yet nonetheless potent, reasons. These will all be addressed in turn.
THE CONTINUrrY ARGUMENT. The traditional explanation
for the long resident work hours, even thirty-six hours straight,
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Timothy B. McCall).
109. Id. One could argue that it really is not in the self-interest of the medical
establishment to prove such causation, because that would not only force a major
regulatory overhaul in the American residency programs, it could subject them to
medical malpractice liability for any regulatory violations.
110. Boodman, supra note 1.
111. Surgeons are particularly opposed to limiting residents' hours, probably because residents in the surgical disciplines tend to log the highest hours. Surgeons "led
the unsuccessful opposition to the [Bell Regulations] and were instrumental in killing
similar measures in Massachusetts and California." Id.
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is the need for continuity of care in two important respects.
First, mistakes are frequently made when a patient is handed off
from an outgoing to an incoming doctor during shift changes
because vital information about that patient slips through the
cracks, and the average incoming resident is often too inexperienced to glean the information him or herself.1 12 Second, senior
doctors note that, pursuant to the traditional educational mission, residents learn best how to provide adequate care by following a patient from the time of admission to the time of
of
discharge, thereby observing the patient at every critical stage 113
his illness or injury and learning how to treat all those aspects.
The absence of continuity, some have suggested, would have "an
adverse effect on physician responsibility and the 'sanctity of the
doctor-patient relationship.' "114
As to the former concern, some doctors have disputed the
sincerity of this explanation. Lucian Leape, a surgeon and adjunct professor at Harvard School of Public Health, responded,
"I think that's disingenuous," and noted that "[s]enior physicians can go home at 5 p.m. We have ways of making sure people don't fall between the cracks. 11 5 Furthermore, there is
little, if any, meaningful empirical evidence to back up this theory.1 16 The latter argument does offer considerable appeal. On
its face, it does seem that there is educational value to be gained
from following a patient case from start to finish. However, it is
unclear that this age-old consideration holds up against competing issues. In other words, the educational benefits to be attained from the continuous responsibility for a patient (even
that required beyond a thirty-six hour shift) inevitably wane in
the face of exhaustion. Indeed, as has been noted, "[c]ommon
sense as well as established principles of adult learning suggest
112. Barnard, supra note 2; Hochman et al., supra note 83.
113. Hochman et al., supra note 83. A third explanation is that learning is maximized by exposure to many patients. See Ian R. Holzman & Scott H. Barnett, The
Bell Commission: Ethical Implications for the Training of Physicians,67 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 136, 137 ("In a medical setting, maximizing learning requires, in a limited
time, exposing our trainees to as many patients and diseases as possible. There is no
question that the most skilled physicians are those who have been exposed to and
cared for the widest range of patients.")
114. Block, supra note 93, at 977.
115. Anne Barnard, Boston Hospitals Reassess Rising Intern Hours, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 29, 2000.
116. See Michael J.Green, What (if Anything) is Wrong with Residency Overwork?, 123 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 512, 513 (1995) (noting that "research [has not
demonstrated] that long hours improve patient outcome by promoting continuity of
care").
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that education is optimized in a climate in which learners are
117
physically and psychologically alert, comfortable, and rested.'
THE "TOUGHEN Up" ARGUMENT. Physicians ascribing to this
viewpoint turn a particularly deaf ear to residents' complaints of
fatigue. The entire residency system was pioneered around one
hundred years ago at Johns Hopkins Medical School and Johns
Hopkins Hospital.'18 It was designed like an old-fashioned fraternal system, in which
[a] doctor was to know everything about medicine, and the entire fund of knowledge was to be learned through trial by fire.
Residents were trained to fear and respect their professors and

attending physicians, who in turn spent most of their time instructing and supervising, often getting to know their charges
on an intensely close mentor basis.' 19

These physicians see sleep deprivation as an absolutely necessary part of training, arguing that it teaches residents to
"subordinate their needs for sleep and food to the unpredictable
and often consuming demands of patient care" 120 and insisting
that residents do learn to transcend fatigue and function effectively, similar to an automatic pilot.1 21 Others argue that the re117. Id. Green cites a study demonstrating that very concept that improved sleep
means better learning. Id. (citing Michael A. Wolf et al., Improved Sleep: A Means of
Reducing the Stress of Internship, TRANSACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN CLINICAL AND
CLIMATOLOGICAL ASSN., THE ONE-HUNDRED THIRD ANN. MEETING 225, 225-31

(1991)).
118. Boodman, supra note 1. Although Harvard, Michigan, and Pennsylvania had
already implemented some clinical training into the fourth year of medical school,
these endeavors were regarded as "well-intentioned anomalies." LUDMERER, supra
note 3, at 48-57, 72. The more far-reaching structural overhaul that Johns Hopkins'
medical education offered is widely credited with spurring the national movement for
medical educational reform. Moreover, John Shaw Billings "designed the Johns Hopkins Hospital in addition to enunciating the educational principles on which the medical school and hospital were based." Id. at 58. For more on the many innovative
contributions Johns Hopkins made to medical education and postgraduate training,
see id. at 58-59, 60-63.
119. Duncan, supra note 49, at 61. Indeed, the residency setup has repeatedly
been compared to fraternity hazing. See, e.g., Japenga, supra note 41, at 1 (quoting a
resident who describes residency as akin to "a sort of hazing that has gone on for
many decades.")
120. Boodman, supra note 1.
121. Id. A letter to the editor of OB GYN News in defense of sleep-deprived
residencies furthers this point, almost to a disturbing degree: "I learned to function
responsibly without thinking. Any given clinical presentation elicited reflexes that
were appropriate to the diagnosis and treatment of that clinical problem, regardless of
my state of mind or level of fatigue ...I can order appropriate diagnostic studies by
rote... I have been programmed to respond appropriately and effectively thanks to
those 4 grueling years of residency." Lawrence J. Lippert, Work Now, Sleep Later,
OB GYN NEWS, June 1, 2000, at 6.
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sidents' sacrifices amount to a rite of passage that "promotes
group cohesion, emphasizes collegiality and bonding, solidifies
social identity, and teaches humility in preparation for power
social roles.

' 122

The sentiment essentially was summed up in a

recent letter to the editor from a senior doctor, which read in
part: "To those residents who demand more time off and more
sleep, I say one thing: Grow up. There's
a reason for every sac23
rifice made in our noble profession.1
The attitude reflects a deeper philosophy about the sort of
mental and physical toughness the medical establishment believes is vital to the success of physicians-in-training, so they go
to great lengths to test these residents' and interns' mettle. This
culture is described in more detail:
[T]he ability to "handle it" is a core value in medicine, which is
...

a "Right Stuff" kind of environment - a culture shared by

astronauts, pilots, Navy Seals and other highly trained elite
groups. "Right Stuff" cultures prize exceptionally hard work,
toughness, intelligence, self-sufficiency, and a refusal to complain .... "[Residents] are smart people, very competitive and
driven in a high-stress environment, which requires a certain
attitude to get through," [observed one physician]. 24
As such, the medical establishment sees fatigue, or the discussion of it, as a weakness.1 2 5 But many others, including doctors,
dispute this notion by pointing out the obvious: Sleep is a vital
human function,126 and "nothing can overcome the inevitable
deterioration caused by sleep loss" when people are repeatedly
forced to perform when their bodies are programmed to
122. Green, supra note 116, at 514 (citing Leanord C. Groopman, Medical Internship as Moral Education: An Essay on the System of Training Physicians, 11 CULTURAL MED. PSYCHIATRY 207, 207-27 (1987)). Green notes a downside to this "selfsacrifice as virtue" theory: "[I]t may unduly promote the impression that physicians
are somehow 'martyrs to virtue', which entitles them to prestige and economic privilege. This impression bolsters the belief that the profession is self-serving and may
contribute to the now commonplace 'doctor-bashing."' Id. (footnotes omitted).
123. Lippert, supra note 121, at 6.
124. Boodman, supra note 1.
125. Id. There is evidence that surgeons take this notion to an even higher degree
than other medical disciplines. Richard Reiling, a former residency director who now
represents the American College of Surgeons at the American Medical Association,
dismisses sleep research, contending that surgeons "'are built differently' and learn to
become impervious to exhaustion. 'That's part of the selection process in surgery,'
added Reiling, who dismisses complaints about fatigue as 'whining."' Id.
126. See, e.g., Mark R. Rosekind et al., Managing Fatiguein OperationalSettings 1:
Physiological Considerations and Countermeasures, 75 Hose. Topics 23, 24 (1997)
("Scientific findings have clearly established that sleep is a complex, active physiological state that is vital to human survival.").

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol12/iss1/4

24

20031

Whetsell: Changing the Law, Changing the Culture: Rethinking the "Sleepy Re

Rethinking the "Sleepy Resident" Problem

sleep. 27 Furthermore, although heavy training can prevent a
certain number of mistakes, it cannot substitute a decent night's
rest in terms of clear-headedness and good judgment.' 28 When
judgment is impaired, the concern moves past the welfare of the
average resident and rests squarely with the thousands of unsuspecting patients who fill America's teaching hospitals daily.
Still, there is a pervading sense that if older doctors made it
through and survived, the younger doctors can and should do so
as well. However, there are at least two important differences
between the past and the present. First, the modern resident is
responsible for a substantially larger amount of knowledge than
the resident of fifty, or even twenty years ago. 129 As one commentator noted,
By today's standards, medicine was primitive. There were
no computerized axial tomography (CAT) scanners, intravenous arterial lines, or intensive-care units; no heart-bypass operations, bedside monitors, Swan-Ganz catheters, or artificial
hips. Hundreds of diseases, diagnoses, and viruses had not yet
been isolated or named; living wills, do-not-resuscitate (DNR)
orders, Medicare, Medicaid, and social workers were
unimagined; AIDS unknown. Physicians and patients smoked,
beepers did not exist, residents numbered fewer than 10,000
(compared with more than 80,000
today), and residencies typi1 30
cally lasted only a year or two.
Not only is the information and technology more sophisticated now, consuming more brain power than was required of
doctors-in-training thirty years ago, but the patients are much
more ill, and the judgment calls demanded are far less clear-cut
than those decisions residents training in the 1950s had to make.
Moreover, residents are forced to call these critical shots at all
131
hours of the night.
Worse, the residents are forced to make these decisions
alone. 132 Unlike the apprentice-type relationship originally envisioned at Johns Hopkins 100 years ago, supervision generally
127. Boodman, supra note 1; see also Rosekind et al., supra note 126, at 25 (explaining that human body's circadian rhythm programs it to sleep at night and to be
awake during the day).
128. Boodman, supra note 1.
129. Japenga, supra note 41.
130. Duncan, supra note 49, at 61.
131. Japenga, supra note 41. In fact, some argue that, for these types of patients,
clear thinking, compassion, and empathy are the key factors-not stamina and selfsacrifice. See Green, supra note 116, at 514.
132. Japenga, supra note 41.
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has been lacking, with the attending physicians going home and
the residents reluctant to call them out of fear of looking
weak. 133 Thus, enhanced knowledge requirements and weakened supervision leave today's residents demonstrably worse off
than their counterparts back in the good old days.
FINANCIAL AND LEGAL ROADBLOCKS. Although rarely, if
ever, mentioned by the medical profession in defense of the residency system, financial considerations constitute a significant,
and some would argue overriding, factor. As mentioned in Part
II.A, one of the benefits to teaching hospitals in its reciprocal
relationship with medical schools is the steady supply of medical
residents willing to work for little money to complete their medical training and gain needed expertise. 3 This bonus has provided a cost-efficient incentive for hospitals to staff the
departments heavily with residents, who earn an average
$35,000 starting salary, 135 and to staff quite leanly with attending
physicians, whose salaries typically start at $150,000.136 Instead,
those doctors are made available at their homes for consultation. However, because of the hospital culture-instilled fear of
bothering attending physicians at home, they are rarely consulted. 137 On the other side of the expertise coin are the ancil133. Fein, supra note 34. ("The senior doctors are often just not here", one resident told a New York Times reporter, "and there's a real taboo about calling them at
home when there's a problem in the middle of the night. It's scary. I'm smart. I'm a
good doctor. But I just don't have enough experience to be making these calls myself."). Id.; see also Barnard, supra note 2 (quoting a former resident who experienced
a similar dilemma).
134. Ronches, supra note 36 ("[t]his system of residency is how we train our doctors. It's also how hospitals exploit them. Since residency is mandatory, house staff
doctors form a captive work force.").
135. See American Medical Association, Resident Income and Debt Relief, at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/7095.htm.
Of course, this varies by hospital and area of the country. For instance, New York City's Catholic Medical Center
offers interns $45,377, while third-year residents receive nearly $54,000. See SEIU
Local 1991-North Broward Hospital District Union Organizing Campaign, Gains
Hospital Employees Have Negotiatedfor Attending Physicians & Residents... Working
Together Works, at http://www.voiceatwork.org/nbhd/gains/residents.html.
136. Miami's Jackson Memorial Hospital, for instance, is paying attending doctors
starting salaries of $150,000 (for inpatient services), $140,000 (for satellite, ambulatory, and urgent care clinics), and $110 per hour (for ER attending doctors), plus
bonuses and benefits. See SEIU Local 1991-North Broward Hospital District Union
Organizing Campaign, supra note 135.
137. Boodman, supra note 1 ("[R]esidents are a captive population afraid to complain - or to admit they are exhausted - because their careers depend on the goodwill
of their supervisors, particularly their residency directors. These senior physicians
have the power to derail, or even to end, a resident's career with a bad
recommendation.").
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lary, or non-physician, tasks1 3 many residents must complete
because there is insufficient ancillary staff available to perform
those services. Hiring less ancillary staff at night and adding
those chores to the residents' "to do" lists saves the hospitals
even more money and exacerbates the residents' sentiments that
they are merely "cheap labor" cogs to be
sacrificed in the big
139
wheel of a health provider organization.
In defense of the medical establishment, many teaching hospitals do not have the financial resources to implement more reasonable work schedules for residents, and cannot feasibly make
the relevant changes without significant government financial
assistance.1 40 Even without the proposed changes in resident
work hours, hospitals struggle daily to stay financially stable:
"[T]he workload in hospitals has increased because of pressure
to treat more patients with shorter lengths of stay in the hospital.11 41 And, since many hospitals are constantly cutting costs,
residents are ideal because they "are a relatively inexpensive
workforce, and they are an economic benefit to the hospital and
its operation. 1' 42 In fact, the shortage of ancillary staff is directly related to budget cutting and the ability to work medical
residents for long periods of time. Harry Franklin, general
counsel with the Committee of Interns and Residents at Boston
Medical Center, commented, "If [hospitals] can work a house
staff officer 80 hours, [then] they don't need as many blooddrawing teams; they don't need as many transporters; they don't
need other people because they have the house staff doing all of
this work. ' 143 Thus, meaningful change probably will not be
138. See supra note 56, explaining this term.
139. Green, supra note 116, at 514 (describing "cheap labor" problem). Some
have disputed the notion that residents are cheap labor, pointing out that they "order
more tests and procedures, are less efficient, and contribute to longer hospital stays"
than do more senior doctors. Id. However, other studies indicate that, based on residents' actual tasks, they are "relatively cheap," and that seems to be the predominant view. Id.
140. Estimated implementation costs for the Bell Regulations were over $300 million for the hospitals in New York State. See Howard W. French, A Limit on Doctors'
Hours is Debated, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 5, 1989, at B3.
141. Kuo, supra note 32, at 180. See also LUDMERER, supra note 3, at 332 n. 47
("With the decline in federal educational subsidies and with the public's growing concern for containing medical costs, teaching hospitals, not just medical schools, have
been financially squeezed.")
142. Kuo, supra note 32, at 180.
143. Eva M. Panchyshyn, Comment, Medical Resident Unionization: Collective
Bargainingby Non-Employees for Better Patient Care, 9 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 111,
113 n.12 (1998) (quoting All Things Considered, National Public Radio, Sept. 4, 1997,
available at 1997 WL 12833407).
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achieved without significant funding from the government. One
physician recently summarized the problems: "Financial pressures, changes in the health-care industry, and growing social
problems are placing our hospitals under an ever-greater burden. Without guidelines that encourage and dollars that enable
hospitals to maintain adequate staff . . . our hospitals simply
'144
won't be able to care for us.
Another probable reason for the lack of adequate supervision
over residents has to do with common law malpractice rules regarding physician negligence. Under the "borrowed servant
rule," a supervising attending physician may be held responsible
for the resident's negligence if such attending physician is considered "the temporary employer of the resident." In general,
"courts have determined that the general right of control that
the attending physician has to direct the medical care of a patient by giving orders to hospital employees, including residents,
'145
is not adequate to make the physician a borrowing employer.
The reasoning is that "[r]esidents are trained professionals and
should be able to perform duties commensurate with their training without direct supervision." And the converse is true:
If, however, a member of the hospital's attending staff assumes direct supervisory control over the details of a house
staff member's specific conduct, that results in patient injury,
then the attending physician may be liable under the borrowed
servant rule. In some states, the courts have imposed liability
upon the attending physician only if the resident's negligent
act occurs
under the physician's direct supervision and
146
control.

Given the borrowed servant doctrine, many attending physicians may be reluctant to engage in a lot of supervision because
this may increase their exposure to potential malpractice liability, by simply being present in the hospital room. They may prefer to allow the resident to shoulder this burden alone. As such,
medical malpractice liability may affect managerial staffing
decisions.
III.

RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM

A number of organizations, federal, state, and private, as well
as internal hospital personnel, have responded to the problem.
144.

Ronches, supra note 36.

145.
146.

Reuter, supra note 9, at 505.
Id. at 505-06 (emphasis added).
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This section will first start with a short description of the history
and ethos of the patient safety movement, which was a backdrop
to the Bell Regulations' enactment.
A.

Background - The Patient Safety Movement

The patient safety movement, first and foremost, understands
that culture is known to contribute to the occurrence of errors
and accidents.147 Therefore, it represents a steadfast commitment to safety as a top priority by developing policies that promote safety. In short, it advocates and strives toward
establishing and maintaining a "safety culture." Safety culture
and its related policies rest on the bedrock of four main ideas.
These ideas were derived from research on the success of "high
reliability organizations": high hazard organizations that,
through solid leadership, have strong track records for safe, reliable performance, such as the aviation, chemical manufacturing,
shipping, nuclear power production industries.148
The first principle acknowledges "the high risk, error-prone
nature of an organization's activities. ' 149 Second, the movement
encourages all relevant players to transcend the prevalent blame
culture (i.e., a knee-jerk inclination to ensure compliance
through retrospective adversive reinforcement measures), 150 and
instead to create and maintain an open flow of information in
order to learn about vulnerabilities to failure (i.e., reporting
without punishment). Third, the movement urges organizations
to contribute resources to address safety concerns, namely by
adopting a systems-approach to better understand how breakdowns can occur. And fourth, it promotes partnerships across
all ranks to seek solutions to vulnerabilities and stimulate sus151
tained investments toward the common goal of utmost safety.
Laura T. Pizzi et al., Promoting a Culture of Safety, MAKING HEALTH CARE
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PATIENT SAFETY PRACTICES, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Pub. No. 01-E058, at 447 (2001) at http://www.ahrq.gov/
clinic/ptsafety/pdf/ptsafety.pdf.
148. Id. at 450.
149. Id. at 448.
150. Id. This Article employs a definition of "blame culture" at its extreme-a
culture that assigns heroes and villains and seeks to punish the villains through retrospective measures, such as fines and lawsuits. This Article does not take issue with
adversive reinforcements as a general rule. Instead, it advocates that when setting
policy legislatures should first explore positive reinforcement alternatives in an effort
to encourage participation, and achieve consensus, among affected groups, which in
turn will result in greater compliance.
151. Id.
147.

SAFER:
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In studying these high reliability organizations, researchers
observed that their safety programs tended to be "behaviorbased"; that is, the organizations identify at-risk behaviors exhibited by the work teams, determine which behaviors may be
modifiable, and implement interventions that reduce errors (and
injuries) by managing those at-risk behaviors. 152 Attitudes
count as well. One study uncovered several common, cultural
values in high reliability organizations: "interpersonal responsibility; person centeredness; [co-workers] helpful and supportive
of one another; friendly, open sensitive personal relations; creativity; achieving goals, strong feelings of credibility; strong feelings of interpersonal trust; and resiliency.' 1 53 Providing
incentives to reward safety-promoting behavior, proceeding
with a teamwork philosophy, and publicly demonstrating a commitment to safety are highly valued by the patient safety movement. In contrast, the movement has identified two particularly
insidious obstacles to safety culture: "a pervasive culture of
blame that impedes acknowledgment of error and professional
silos that offer unique challenges to changing any universal aspect of health care, including culture. ' 154 Experts in culture
safety urge "[a] comprehensive organizational assessment of
barriers,' 55 and if such barriers do emerge, health provider organizations should "[d]evelop a summary of the findings and
take highly visible steps toward meaningful improvements based
on the most critical findings. 156
B.

New York Legislative Response

As was discussed earlier, in the wake of the Libby Zion case,
New York appointed the Bell Committee to devise regulations
to govern medical residency programs. The Committee's principle goals were "to insure that novice physicians, who give much
of the front-line care in hospitals, are properly rested and not
solely responsible for complex medical judgments.' 1 57 The committee also hoped to "to turn New York's teaching hospitals into
152. Id. at 450.
153. Pizzi et al., supra note 147, at 448 (quoting K.H. Roberts, Cultural Characteristics of Reliability Enhancing Organizations,5 J. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 165 (1993)).
154. Id. at 451.
155. Henri Manasee, Jr., Close to Home: Your Own Staff Can Solve Many
Problems with Your Hospital's Medication System, 75 HosP. & HEALTH NETWORK 82
(2001).
156. Id.
157. Fein, supra note 34.
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more collegial environments, in which residents could comfortably seek out attending physicians as teachers. ' 158 Their work
laid the groundwork for the Bell Regulations, which are located
in New York's Health Code and must be followed by hospitals
where residents, interns, and medical students care for patients.1 59 The principal guidelines here follow.
LIMITATION

ON RESIDENT

AND ATTENDING

PHYSICIAN

HOURS. Under the Regulations, residents with inpatient care responsibilities are limited to an average of eighty-hour workweeks (calculated over four-week periods) and may not be
scheduled for shifts exceeding twenty-four consecutive hours.160
Emergency room residents are restricted to 12-hour shifts.16
"On-call" duty is exempted from the eighty-hour and twentyfour-hour limitations only if (1) during the duty, residents are
"generally resting" and are only interrupted infrequently to care
for patients for whom the residents have "continuing responsibility," (2) the duty is limited to every third night, (3) residents
get 16-hour breaks afterward, and (4) the hospital has policies
and procedures in place to immediately relieve fatigued residents.1 62 The regulations also require minimum eight-hour
breaks between shifts and at least one scheduled day off per
week.1 63 Furthermore, hospitals must implement policies concerning "limits on the assigned responsibilities"' 64 and "dual employment"1 65 of residents.
RESIDENT AND INTERN SUPERVISION. The Regulations mandate that residents and interns may provide patient care only if
158.
159.

Id.
Moore & Gaier, supra note 67.

160.

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 405.4(b)(6)(ii)(a)-(b) (2001). The

Department of Health Commissioner, however, may grant exceptions for schedules
up to 15 hours on case-by-case bases based on criteria set out in § 405.4(b)(6)(i)(a)(c).
161. Id. at § 405.4(b)(6)(i). The Department of Health Commissioner, however,
may grant exceptions for schedules up to 15 hours on a case-by-case basis based on
criteria set out in § 405.4(b)(6)(i)(a)-(c).
162. Id. at § 405.4(b)(6)(ii)(d).
163. Id. at § 405.4(b)(6)(iv).
164. Id. at § 405.4(b)(6)(iii).
165. Id. at § 405.4(b)(6)(v). Some residents, due to the low pay of residency,
"moonlight" (work extra shifts) to supplement their income, greatly exacerbating the
sleepy resident problem. See Ashish K. Jha et al., Fatigue, Sleepiness, and Medical
Errors, MAKING HEALTH CARE SAFER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PATIENT SAFETY
PRACTICES 519, 520 (Kaveh Shojania et al. eds.) (2001). The idea behind this provision is that hospitals should count the moonlighting hours as part of the workweek.
See Barbara A. DeBuono & Wayne M. Osten, The Medical Resident Workload: The
Case of New York State, 280 JAMA 1882 (1998).
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certain conditions are met. Such conditions are determined by
the medical staff after review of the "licensure, education, training, physical and mental capacity and experience" of the residents and interns regarding patient care services they have
provided.166 Hospital staff also must develop written policies
and procedures governing such medical practice, including
guidelines setting out which situations require supervision and
consultation. Moreover, medical staff must "continuously monitor[ ]" residents "to assure provision of quality patient care services.1 6 7 In certain "acute care" specialties, a sufficient number
of board-certified physicians (or those having completed at least
four years of postgraduate training) must provide this supervision, 16 and the regulations spell out specific supervision require169
ments for surgical residencies.
ANCILLARY STAFF. The Regulations also require hospitals to
maintain adequate ancillary staff- IV, phlebotomy, transport,
'170
messenger, and housekeeping-at all times.
ENFORCEMENT. Officially, enforcement is through citations
and fines when violations are discovered. How much teeth the
New York legislature intended to provide the regulations beyond this, however, is currently unclear. Thomas Moore, plaintiff's attorney in the Libby Zion case, argues that violations of
the regulations leave the hospital per se liable, under medical
malpractice theory, for compensatory and punitive damages to
any patient injured during a time of the Regulation's violation.
He (and Matthew Gaier) reasoned:
When a patient is injured as a result of the negligence of a
resident, intern or medical student, not only is the hospital vicariously liable, but it may be liable for its own negligence as
well, if it failed to provide proper supervision or if it permitted
an overworked physician to care for the patient. If there was a
violation of any of the regulations set forth above, that viola166.

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 405.4(f)(2) (2001).

167. Id. at § 405.4(f)(3)(ii).
168. Id. at § 405.4(f)(3)(iii). The enumerated specialties are "anesthesiology, family practice medicine, obstetrics, pediatrics, psychiatry, and surgery." Id.
169. Id. at § 405.4(f)(3)(iv) (requiring that: [S]upervision by attending physicians
of the care provided to surgery patients by postgraduates in training must include as a
minimum:
(a) personal supervision of all surgical procedures requiring general anesthesia or'
an operating room procedure;
(b) preoperative examination and assessment by the attending physician; and
(c) postoperative examination and assessment no less frequently than daily by the
attending physician...)
170. Cf Ronches, supra note 36.

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol12/iss1/4

32

2003]

Whetsell: Changing the Law, Changing the Culture: Rethinking the "Sleepy Re

Rethinking the "Sleepy Resident" Problem

tion constitutes171evidence of negligence and the jury should be
so instructed.

This particular ambiguity notwithstanding, the Bell Regulations received, and continue to receive, wide praise from the
public and popular press. The American Medical Association
(AMA) and the Association of American Medical Colleges
(AAMC) also endorsed them. 172 However, they were opposed
by many other power medical organizations. A small handful of
other states - Massachusetts, California, Pennsylvania, and Hawaii - considered adopting legislation limiting residents' hours in
the late 1980s. None of the bills were successful. Two California
bills were thwarted in 1987 and 1988,73 due at least in part to
the opposition from the California medical community, including the California Medical Association and the California Association of Hospitals and Health Systems. These organizations
maintained, "if limits are needed, they should be set by the profession and not by legislators who don't understand the scheduling requirements of various specialty programs. ' 174 While this
may be true, California hospitals have not made many strides
out of their own volition, indicating that they do not see a problem with the work hours or are otherwise unwilling to deal seriously with the issue. 175 As of 2002, New York is the only state in
the United States regulating work hours for medical residents,176
although a number of other countries regulate, including Great
171. Moore & Gaier, supra note 67. See further discussion infra at note 239 and
accompanying text.
172. Holzman & Barnett, supra note 113, at 138; Block, supra note 93.
173. Boodman, supra note 1. California State Senator Joseph B. Montoya (DWhittier) introduced legislation (S.B. 858) in the California Senate in 1987, "but the
bill died in January after passing a legislative time limit." Assembly-woman Jackier
Speier (D-San Mateo) introduced legislation in 1988, but similarly, it went nowhere.
Massachusetts hospitals thwarted proposed regulatory legislation by adopting voluntary guidelines instead. Barnard, supra note 115. Hawaii and Pennsylvania also were
contemplating legislation to limit residents' work hours, but those proposed regulations did not come to pass either. Japenga, supra note 41.
174. Japenga, supra note 41.
175. Id. Such skepticism as to the existence of a problem was evident even while
the California bills were still being considered. Ken Todd, then-spokesman for the
California Medical Association, said, "The CMA is not in favor of legislation that
would specify hours for residents or interns, but we're certainly desirous of finding a
way of dealing with the problem-if there is a problem-of patient care." Id. (emphasis added.)
176. Barnard, supra note 115. New Jersey may soon join New York, however. On
June 20, 2002, the New Jersey State Assembly passed a bill to regulate resident work
hours in a similar manner as New York. See New Jersey Legislature, at http://
www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp. The bill currently is pending in the state senate's Health, Human Services and Senior Citizens Committee. Id.
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Britain,177 New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Ireland, Denmark,
Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands.' 78
C.

The FederalResponse
1.

Early Responses.

In the past few years, the federal government has taken an
interest in the general issue of patient safety. Its interest was
sparked in December 1999, when the IOM released a report,
entitled To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System, 7 9
which shocked the nation with its controversial finding 180 that
medical errors cause up to 98,000 deaths in American hospitals
annually. The report included numerous recommendations to
remedy the problem. The report's estimate of deaths as a result
of care "spurred politicians and leaders of healthcare organizations to action. ' 181 Indeed, "[t]he resulting action has been swift
and strong, with organizations at national, state, and local levels
debating the issue and developing new initiatives.118 2 President
Clinton established the Quality Interagency Coordination Task
Force in 1998 to respond to the IOM report, 183 and has empowered the [f]ederal Agency for Health
Research and Quality
184
(AHRQ) to address the problem.
177. Jesper Poulsen, Junior Doctors and the EC Draft Directive on Working
Hours: Britain Should Not Have Sought to Exempt Juniors, 307 BRIT. MED. J. 1158.
It is noteworthy, though, that, "at Britain's behest, the European Council of Ministers
decided [in 1993] to exempt doctors in training from the directive on working hours."
Id. Apparently, "Britain threatened to vote against the directive unless doctors in
training were exempted." (As it was, Britain abstained from voting.). Still, the directive does apply to doctors "the moment a doctor finished his or her training," and as
such, "the doctors in training grade posts who have completed their specialist training
would be covered under the terms of the directive." Id.
178. Id. In Denmark, Norway, and Sweden junior doctors work 37-45 hours a
week, and in the Netherlands they are limited to 48 hours." Id. New Zealand's guidelines "includ[e] a maximum workweek of 72 hours, averaged over a four-week period,
along with work limits of 12 consecutive hours in the emergency room and 16 hours in
other departments." Id.
179. Kohn, supra note 87, and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 87, at 1123 (challenging IOM's accuracy in calculating 98,000 "errors").
181. Charles E. Billings & David D. Woods, Human Error in Perspective: The
Patient Safety Movement, POSTGRADUATE MED., Jan. 1, 2001, at 14, available at http://
postgradmed.com/issues/2001/01-01/editorial-jan.htm.
182. Id.
183. Damon Adams, Push to Improve Patient Safety Slowgoing, AM. MED. NEWS,
MAY 7, 2001, at 1, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick 01/
pr120507.htm.
184. Billings & Woods, supra note 181, at 14.
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Meanwhile, Congress held hearings to determine the best way
to address the problem. Picking up on the idea of the patient
safety movement, Congress allocated $50 million dollars in 2001
to establish the national patient safety center. The AHRQ designated one of its existing programs as the national patient
safety center and renamed it the Center for Quality Improvement and Patient Safety. The Center's identified purpose is to
"educate patients about safety issues and conduct research on
how to reduce medical errors and convert findings into im'
proved practices."185
The AHRQ also expects to award up to
$25 million annually to establish other centers for safety research and practice and generally to support safety research and
education through grants.186 In the spirit of the safety culture,
the federal government also implemented programs at the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of Defense, and
the National Quality Forum. 187
2.

Recent (Failed) Bills.

The past few years have seen some attempts at patient safety
legislation. Most notably, on June 15, 2000, both Senators Jim
Jeffords (R-Vt), chair of the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, and Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass), the committee's ranking Democrat, presented bills calling for voluntary
(but not mandatory) 188 reporting of medical errors and near
misses in a national database,' 89 a federal center within the
AHRQ to study and help prevent medical errors, and "sweeping
protections for health care practitioners and patients to ensure
data produced to analyze and reduce errors is protected from
discovery and not used for punishment."' 90 Major safety culture
themes, including inclusion and a blame-free culture, ran
through the provisions. As an aide to Senator Jeffords explained, "If your goal is to catch people, then you want the
thumbscrews and all the mandatory requirements. If you want
185.
186.
187.
188.

Adams, supra note 183, at 1.
Id.
Id.
Linda 0. Prager, Safety Bills Take Voluntary Tack on Reporting Errors,AM.
MED. NEWS, July 3, 2000, at 6, availableat http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/
pick_00/gvsb07O3.htm. Although the IOM report called for both mandatory and voluntary reporting systems, believing that mandatory reporting is necessary for true accountability among medical professionals, politicians felt that, realistically, "such
mandates would be a nonstarter for action on Capitol Hill." Id.
189. Adams, supra note 183, at 1.
190. Prager, supra note 188, at 6.
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to focus on quality and create a system where you get information to improve practice, we believe a voluntary system is the
way to go and will attract support." 191 However, despite support
from major health care groups, 192 "[n]either proposal reached a
1 93

vote."

3.

The Current Bill.

A new bill, entitled the Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act of 2001,194 introduced in November 2001 by United
States Representative John Conyers (D-Mich.) and sponsored
by twelve other Democratic congressman, proposed to set strict
95
national limits on the number of resident work hours.
Modeled after the Bell Regulations, 96 the proposed legislation
limits resident work hours to eighty per week, limits residents'
shift lengths to twenty-four consecutive hours, and guarantees
197
one day off per week and one full weekend off per month.
The bill's proposed enforcement methods, however, seem to include more teeth than did the Bell Regulations. They require
annual anonymous surveys to residents to determine compliance, 198 on-site inspections (based on survey results), 199 and provide a pool of money for hospitals to comply with the
provisions. 20 0 Alternatively, residents may file grievances with
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to report such violations,2 °1 with the protection of a whistleblower provision. 0 2
Hospitals violating the law would be subject to stiff fines up to
$100,000.203

191. Id.
192. Id. ("Five groups-including the American College of Physicians-American Society of Internal Medicine and the American Hospital Assn.-already have
signed on to the Jeffords bill, applauding its voluntary, non-punitive approach.")
193. Adams, supra note 183, at 1.
194. H.R. 3236, 107th Cong. (2001). Under this proposal, the new provisions
would amend § 1866 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc. H.R. 3236, 107th
Cong. § 3(a) (2001).
195. Abel, supra note 44.
196. See John Conyers, The Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act of
2001, at http://www.house.gov/conyers/news-patientsafetyprtectionact.htm.
197. Abel, supra note 44.
198. Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 3236, 107th
Cong. § 3(b)(4)(A) (2001).
199. Id. at § 3(b)(4)(B).
200. Id. at § 4.
201. Id. at § 3(b)(2).
202. Id. at § 3(c).
203. Id. at § 3 (b)(3).
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Senior doctors and medical institutions have, thus far, been
critical of federal guidelines, arguing that they "look at the
symptoms of the problem rather than the roots of the problem,"
and that "[f]ocusing on duty hours neglects looking at supervision, the content of the program, and resources of the program.
'20 4
It's really the institutions who must take responsibility.
But the bill's supporters, including the American Medical Student Association,2 5 counter that hospitals have not taken responsibility, thereby leaving the door open to federal regulation
to ensure the patient safety that the medical establishment has
been accused of neglecting. 20 6 As of April 15, 2002, the bill is
still in committee.20 7 More recently, Senator Jon Corzine (DNJ) introduced a parallel bill in the Senate on June 12, 2002,
which is also currently in committee.2 °8
IV.

RETHINKING THE REGULATORY ROUTE:
NEW YORK

LESSONS FROM

There are a number of important considerations Congress
should weigh before enacting these regulations. This does not
mean that Congress should not implement any legislation, but
there is a legislative tendency to see one problem and try to attack it with very issue-specific legislation for a quick fix. New
York's experience sheds significant light on important roadblocks to the effectiveness of legislative regulations, a discussion
of which follows.
204. Abel, supra note 44.
205. Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, ACGME Highlights
it Standards on Resident Duty Hours (2001) at http://www.acgme.org. Actually,
AMSA, along with Public Citizen and the Committee of Interns and Residents (CIR),
filed a petition with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) on
April 30, 2001 urging adoption of federal regulations that limit resident work hours.
Id. The implication is that federal action either at the regulatory or statutory level
would be satisfactory for AMSA's members.
206. See AMSA, supra note 33.
207. Specifically, on November 6, 2001 the bill was referred to the House Subcommittee on Health. See 2001 Bill Tracking H.R. 3236; 107 Bill Tracking H.R. 3236, at
LEXIS-NEXIS Congressional Universe-Document, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/
congcomp.
208. Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act of 2002, S.2614, 107th Cong.
(2002). After its introduction, the bill was referred to the Committee on Finance,
where it currently remains. See 2002 Bill Tracking S.2614, 107 Bill Tracking S.2614, at
LEXIS-NEXIS Congressional Universe-Document, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/
congcomp.
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Efficacy of the New York Statute - Noncompliance

By far, the biggest problem with the Bell Regulations is the
lack of compliance with its directives. Indeed, they are being
widely ignored. 20 9 New York's DOH acknowledged in 1995
compliance among hospitals in the city has been irregular and is
getting worse. In 1989, DOH investigators found that sixty-two
percent of the hospitals it surveyed were out of compliance in at
least one department. That noncompliance rate was seventyone percent in 1990-91, and ninety-two percent in 1994.210
Time did not heal the noncompliance issue. Former New
York City Public Advocate Mark Green issued a report in late
1997 announcing that trainees routinely work more than the legally permitted hours per week and often without the requisite
monitoring of diagnoses and treatments by senior doctors.211
Green's report further determined that some violations "either
directly resulted in or were a factor in harm to patients. 2 1 2: And
in March 1998, "[a] series of raids conducted by [New York's
DOH] at prestigious teaching hospitals... found numerous violations, including the case of one resident who worked a stagger'213
ing 136-hour week.
In response to the report, the New York Times conducted
dozens of interviews with residents who confirmed the findings. 214 Residents also observed that other teaching hospitals,
while appearing to be compliant, managed to circumnavigate
the regulations through other means. Typically, the hospital will
not post a schedule officially listing residents as working in ex209. Moore & Gaier, supra note 67 (citing Fein, supra note 34).
210. Ronches, supra note 36.
211. Fein, supra note 34.
212. Id. One patient was administered the wrong drug because of "inadequate
resident supervision"; another patient suffered respiratory arrest after having a
breathing tube removed prematurely by a resident who "was not effectively supervised." Id. And yet another patient entered the hospital with a hand problem, was
never seen by an attending surgeon, and ultimately died from sepsis. Id. New York
State Department of Health Commissioner Barbara DeBuono also acknowledged
that noncompliance was "not uncommon" and that some violations led to injury and
death. Id.
213. Boodman, supra note 1. The DOH reported that "37% of all residents
worked more than 85 hours per week, 20% of all residents and 60% of surgical residents worked more than 95 hours per week, and 38% of all residents and 67% of all
surgical residents worked more than 24 consecutive hours." Jha et al., supra note 165,
at 520.
214. Fein, supra note 34. Residents reported working, on average, 95 to 110 hours
per week, which, while better than the pre-Bell Regulations 125 hours per week, still
violates the regulations. Id.
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cess of the statutory maximum. Instead, "separate schedules
were drawn up for clinic and in-patient duties, and the two lists
were not reconciled. ' 21 5 Other times, senior doctors used tacit
understandings: "[A]lthough a schedule may list [residents], for
example, as working [a twelve-hour shift], it was made clear to
them that they should actually arrive an hour or two before the
216
starting time and that they were expected to stay late, too.
Moreover, "technically optional" conferences, at which "attendance is taken and expected," are not included in the work schedule, despite the Bell Regulations' proscription.217
Green's report also found ancillary staffing to be severely inadequate, despite the $55 million the state gives to hospitals annually to help them comply with those regulations. Green's
staffers also observed that residents were still engaging in much
non-physician work because of the problem. And, while the
state gives hospitals $55 million a year to help them comply with
the ancillary staff regulations, "very few hospitals can account
for how they spend that money," which angers state officials.218
One could argue that getting implementation off the ground
takes several years, after which the effects become more noticeable. Yet twelve years later, many hospitals still violate the
rules. Therefore, the problem seems to transcend financial considerations. No matter how much money New York pumps into
the project, it may not be enough to conquer the underlying
problems.
B. Reasons for Noncompliance
Financial Considerations-HospitalCompliance Costs. Hospitals argue that hiring the necessary physicians and ancillary
staff, as well as making miscellaneous administrative changes to
accommodate the new regulations, is prohibitively expensive.
On the other hand, the state gave New York City hospitals a
significant amount of annual funding to comply with the regulations, and the DOH has not required, nor have hospitals offered, an accounting of the money. The implication is that the
hospitals eagerly accept the money but use the funds on other
things, and not for its intended purpose.2 19
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Ronches, supra note 36.
219. See id. (advocating for, at minimum, an accounting of the monies provided to
determine on what improvements it was spent and how much more might be needed).
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No matter who is right and who is wrong, hospitals probably
entertain a legitimate concern over compliance costs. The federal government should be committed at the outset to the idea
of getting hospitals to comply by providing extra dollars to those
hospitals to get them up to code. Otherwise, we will see the
same old story: hospitals in rich areas complying, and hospitals
in poor areas not complying, both because the population in
poor areas is less powerful in enforcing the requirements
(thereby effectively negating the real incentive for hospitals to
comply), and because the hospitals in poorer areas simply lack
the financial means to implement the changes.
OrganizationalConsiderations-Lackof Administrative Commitment. The Bell Regulations, over the years, have suffered
from a number of monitoring deficiencies. 220 First, critics note
that there was insufficient funding to enforce the strictures.22 '
This problem was exacerbated by New York's city and state governments' budget cuts of their enforcement agencies, steadily eroding the Department of Health's ability to monitor and enforce
the guidelines. Indeed, "[t]he Giuliani administration and the
Health and Hospitals Corporation have targeted the public
health-care system's already decimated central offices for almost
complete elimination, while the DOH accreditation staff (one of
the finest monitoring staffs in this country) has been similarly
ravaged." Therefore, while the DOH was able to visit thirty
New York City hospitals in 1989, the number of visits dropped
to twelve in 1993, and have been on the decline ever since.222
Not only was the risk of getting caught low, the penalties for
violation were not steep - only $2,000 per violation. 23
The state legislature more recently has attempted to turn the
tide on this administrative erosion. In early 2000, the state legislature earmarked $168 million of a $2.9 billion dollar health
budget "for a crackdown on hospitals that force medical residents to work past the point of exhaustion. '224 The new provision also provides the DOH with funds for annual staffing audits
and increases the maximum fine amount to $50,000 for a repeat
violation. 225 Although some have praised these new efforts, 226 it
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Susan Rubinowitz, Hosp. Docs No Longer the Young and the Rest-less, N.Y.
POST, Jan. 26, 2000, at 18.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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remains to be seen what the actual effect these changes will have
on residency programs and, ultimately, on medical errors. At
the very least, New York's experience shows that meaningful
change requires a great deal of continuous government support
in terms of money and attention.
"Conscientious" Objectors. Some doctors had vowed not to
honor the regulations from the beginning, purportedly believing
in their hearts that the changes would lead to detrimental effects
on patients, including lost information from the discontinuity in
care provided to those patients.227 This view was bolstered by
one post-Bell Regulations study published in 1993, finding that
patients were now more likely to suffer from complications and
delays in the performance of diagnostic tests and extended hospital stays.228 But critics counter that the study is "bogus" because it was conducted at a single hospital only three months
after the Regulations' passage, failing to allow adequate time for
adjustments.229 Meanwhile, another study developed a scheduling model designed to reduce sleep deprivation and improve
continuity, and demonstrated decreases in lab test ordering and
length of hospital stays.23 °
It is also interesting that the federal bill declines to set supervisory standards for residents or require certain amounts of ancillary staff, but rather limits its strictures to resident work
hours. Ironically, of the three areas, the work hours are what
healthcare provider institutions object to most voraciously; they
still adhere to the master-apprentice model and thus favor the
notion of adequate supervision, at least in theory, if not in
practice.
Cultural Considerations. Despite the best of intentions, the
Bell Regulations largely failed to take into account that hospi226. Id. (quoting Bertrand Bell, founder of the Bell Regulations, as calling new
measures "a win-win situation").
227. Sarah Boseley, Doctors "Cannot Admit Mistakes," GUARDIAN, Mar. 17,
2000, available at 2000 WL 17213925.
228. Christine Lame et al., The Impact of a Regulation Restricting Medical House
Staff Working Hours on the Quality of Patient Care, 269 JAMA 374, 377 (1993) (concluding that "[c]ontinuity may be important and better care may be provided by a
tired physician who is familiar with the patient than by a rested physician who is less
familiar with the patient").
229. See, e.g., Laura Buterbaugh, Limiting Residents' Hours: Study Finds Unexpected Rise in Test Delays and Complications (New York Hospital, New York), MED.
WORLD NEWS, Feb. 1, 1993, at 56, available at 1993 WL 12241110.
230. Daniel J. Gottlieb et al., Effect of a Change in House Staff Work Schedule on
Resource Utilization and Patient Care, 151 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2065, 2065
(1991).
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tals "are most supportive of steep hierarchies in which junior
staff do not question senior staff." As such, physicians exercise
a great deal of control over healthcare delivery and they simply
do not want to be told what to do, particularly in the absence of
what they deem solid empirical findings that contradict their
healthcare philosophy.
There is great reluctance to abide by government standards
for two additional reasons. First, hospitals traditionally set their
own standards, or theoretically follow the guidelines set by the
accrediting organization and are generally suspicious of federal
or state interference. The concern here is that "regulations may
be crafted by legislators who lack intimate knowledge of the
health care system" and fail to understand the heterogeneity
within America's health care system.231 Second, such regulations put in place yet another blame system, which violates the
very idea of the patient safety movement. Aside from the possible citations and monetary penalties for failure to comply, an
overwhelming fear of malpractice liability makes hospitals very
defensive. After all, it is possible that courts in the future could
hold hospitals responsible for compensatory and punitive damages for mistakes made while not in compliance with regulations.232 Thus, although the Bell Committee sought to change
that culture,233 it did not take adequate account of which cultural factors can easily be changed simply by enacting a set of
regulations, and which cannot.
There is no reason why the federal government must follow in
this same path. A better approach would be to carefully assess
hospital culture, determine which facets are instrumental and
which ones must be altered, and work within these boundaries
to eventually change the boundaries. Working within such a
model, and simply announcing to a hospital, "Thou shall not
overwork interns," will not suffice. This does not mean that
Congress should accept all hospital culture. For instance, some
of the more egregious examples of hazing and hell nights, argua231. Robert Trowbridge & Robert M. Wachter, Legislation, Accreditation, and
Market-Driven and Other Approaches to Improving Patient Safety, in MAKING
HEALTH

CARE

SAFER:

A

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

OF PATIENT

SAFETY

PRAcTICES,

Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Pub. No. 01-E058, at 602 (2001) at
http://www.ahrq.gov/clinci/ptsafety/pdf/ptsafety.pdf.
232. See infra notes 171 and 239, and accompanying text.
233. Fein, supra note 34 ("'We wanted these laws to change the culture,' said Dr.
[Bertrand] Bell [founder of New York's Bell Regulations].. .They didn't.") (emphasis
added).
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bly putting hospital patients at a significantly higher risk, are not
acceptable. Those aspects of the culture must be changed.
However, other parts are not only deeply entrenched but
serve useful purposes not overshadowed by grave risks to patients. In particular, the virtues associated with the patient
safety movement are good examples after which legislation
should be modeled, particularly since most hospitals and medical organizations clearly are on board. Moreover, the federal
government has implemented structures under its ideals in the
past.234 The better approach would take the virtues identified in
the patient safety movement and implement a system that adheres to them (i.e., work with hospitals, not against them).
Conclusion. Given the experience of New York State, the
federal government would have an uphill battle in implementing
and enforcing the regulations as the bill currently stands, particularly given financial and cultural considerations. Congress
would have to be committed financially to the venture by providing hospitals with significant sums of money to bring their
residency programs up to code. Thereafter, Congress would
have to be committed to an administrative organization (presumably under HHS's Medicare umbrella), providing it with sufficient means to inspect hospitals regularly and to enforce the
regulations as they discover violations. Although the proposed
bill currently guarantees sufficient funds to bring hospitals up to
code,23 5 budget cuts regarding healthcare regimes are not unknown at the federal level. It is not clear that Congress is ready
to make these sorts of commitments, nor is it clear that Congress should make these commitments in the absence of a meaningful consideration of both hospital culture and safety culture.
By taking into consideration the hospitals' problems, philosophies, and needs, Congress can create a broader-based strategy
that would be more widely supported within the medical community and thus be more effective toward the goal of optimal
patient safety.

234. See supra note 187, and accompanying text.
235. See Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 3236,
107th Cong. § 4 (2001).
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PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE FOR CONGRESS

What Congress' Strategy Should Take into Account

The New York experience has demonstrated that, if nothing
else, compliance is dependent upon a commitment to address
structural, financial, and most importantly, cultural roadblocks.
Therefore, the federal law should likewise attack all of these
elements.
1.

Safety Culture Considerations

At the same time that we assess the validity of various hospital culture ideals, we should be ready to decide whether we are
willing to integrate safety culture into the plan. As discussed
earlier, the patient safety movement operates under four main
principles: (1) acknowledgment of risky activity, (2) rejection of
emphasis on blame to improve flow of communications, (3)
adoption of systems approach to determine etiology behind
breakdowns, and (4) cross-rank and cross-cultural partnerships
to seek solutions that enhance safety.236 Additionally, the safety
programs tend to be behavior-based and team-oriented. If the
federal goal is to encourage hospitals to aim toward their goals,
then the federal strategy should be consistent with these goals as
well.
2.

Hospital Culture Considerations

As discussed earlier, we must evaluate past traditions and current values, and make conscious decisions about which should
stay and which must go. We must examine each tradition and
value, determine which ones are fundamental, and figure out a
way to show doctors that certain traditions are outdated and
should be abandoned for the common good of residents, patients, hospitals, and the medical profession in general (i.e., to
stay professional and to foster a happy environment and better
learning opportunities). We must work within and, in some
cases, transform the culture, depending on what is outdated and
what is not. There are many examples, and a few that were discussed in this Article are given below.
Science & Skepticism About Empirical Evidence. As was discussed earlier in this Article, one of the reasons senior doctors
and hospital administration have not been more sympathetic to
residents' complaints about long hours and poor supervision is
236.

See supra notes 149-151, and accompanying text.
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because they are skeptical of the accuracy of the assertions. Instead, they counter, with little or no supporting evidence, that
continuity of care is sacrificed if laws force hospitals to move to
the other end of the spectrum. It is not helpful to counter doctors' skepticism over the accuracy of the empirical evidence on
sleep deprivation by retorting, "But isn't it obvious?" Instead,
we should end the debate now with a scientifically-based empirical study conducted by government-selected and American Hospital Association (AHA) or American Medical Association
(AMA) selected doctors to determine the answer.237 If the
study shows definitively that sleep-deprived residents do in fact
make bad doctors, we can proceed with limits. Once we get the
doctors on board with each aspect of the game plan (i.e., that
certain changes are necessary and will benefit the hospital in the
long run), they will be more eager to participate.238
"Sink or swim" attitude. Many physicians take a superhuman
view of the average physician-resident, believing they can overcome enormous backlogs of sleep deprivation, and that what
does not kill the resident will make him or her stronger. This
deeply-entrenched attitude will be the hardest to combat, but
changing this attitude is key to the success of residency reform.
Perhaps a proper empirical study showing the detriment to patients will provide the much-needed change in attitude. Or, perhaps other compromises will be necessary.
Malpractice liability. A major roadblock to more active physician participation on this topic is the fear that if real evidence
emerges demonstrating the ill effects of long resident work
hours and lack of attending supervision, hospitals will be exposed to even more malpractice liability. This liability will give
lawyers more impetus to file lawsuits against hospitals no matter
how earnestly they try to comply with the regulations. Such a
sentiment on the part of physicians is not totally unfounded.
Thomas A. Moore, plaintiff's attorney in the Libby Zion lawsuit,
recently argued that New York courts have a legal basis for assessing compensatory and punitive damages against hospitals if

237. The benefit of an integrated research team is that any further objections to
the study's methodology can be preempted by assembling, at the outset, a research
design upon which all can agree. This lack of agreement has thwarted the probative
value of earlier research attempts. See supra Part II.B.4.
238. This proposed study is addressed again, infra, at Part V.B.
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a patient is injured by a resident subject to a work schedule that
violates the Bell Regulations.239
Although the legal posture Moore and Gaier adopt has the
advantage of allowing some aggrieved patients (who choose the
often lengthy and punishing path of tort litigation) 240 more access to legal redress, there are two issues Congress (and any
state legislators) should keep in mind when considering the proposal. First, the proposal does not address the wider issue of the
patient safety movement, which is determining how to improve
the delivery of medical services and thereby preventing (or reducing) iatrogenic errors. The 10M, in releasing its 1999 report,
emphasized that its purpose was "how to make systems safer,
... not on 'getting rid of bad apples,' or individuals with patterns
of poor performance. '241 Expanded malpractice liability, while
not wholly incompatible with endeavors to improve patient
safety, also does not do much to advance the cause. Second,
talk of increased malpractice liability will not bring doctors to
the table to discuss this sensitive topic. This does not mean that
malpractice liability should be eliminated, or that Moore and
Gaier's proposal absolutely cannot be implemented. However,
extended malpractice liability offers repercussions that should
be considered at the outset, and any further extension should
not be embarked upon lightly. At the very least, a rush to implement such a proposal seems hasty, given the probative value
that alternative approaches, such as the patient safety model,
may hold.
Before proceeding, legislators must meet this issue head-on.
They can try to solve the problem through increased malpractice
239. See Moore & Gaier, supra note 67. Moore and Gaier provide "support" in
the case law for their theory that regulatory violations necessarily lead to punitive
damages by citing Figueroa v. Flatbush Women's Services Inc., 608 N.Y.S.2d 235 (2d
Dep't 1994), which upheld a punitive damages award "based on the existence of factual issues of whether a defendant was performing abortions in violation of state and
municipal regulations[.]" Moore & Gaier, supra note 67. But the defendant in Figueroa apparently was performing abortions without a license (i.e., no legal authority)
and thus "'an issue of gross recklessness or wanton conduct ha[d] been raised.'" Id.
(quoting Figueroa, 201 A.D.2d at 614). It still seems undecided as to whether a pattern of violations constitutes gross misconduct without anything further, or whether a
violation of these types of regulations would even amount to gross misconduct.
Nonetheless, the idea of taking part in a lawsuit seeking to argue such groundbreaking legal issues doubtlessly holds little appeal to the average physician or hospital.
240. Take, for example, the Libby Zion case. Libby died in 1984, and the case was
not ultimately resolved until 1995, with a decidedly disappointing result for her family
and attorney. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
241. Kohn et al., supra note 87, at 9.
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liability (traditional adverse reinforcement, or "blame culture"
tools). A different method might be to approach the problem
by employing a safety culture regime. In implementing a safety
culture regime, legislators must proceed with caution. First,
they need to be keenly aware of this very sensitive issue and be
prepared to work within doctors' concerns. Second, within the
context of their first task, legislators should be prepared to consider the feasibility of extending such liability. In other words,
they need to understand if they can implement extended malpractice liability without destroying the framework of safety culture (which necessarily requires the medical community's
participation). In fact, as this Article has noted, there is a great
deal of evidence suggesting that doctors will not participate in
any reform, even within the safety culture framework, if malpractice liability is extended.
Therefore, legislators may need to compromise with physicians who are wary of any new legislation that could lead to
more malpractice lawsuits. One way (although not necessarily
the only way) to accomplish this is to limit the ability of patients
to use the new legislation to extend malpractice suits, particularly where punitive damages are concerned. Although placing
limits on malpractice liability is not necessarily the only solution,
curtailing malpractice liability in this area is consistent with eschewing "blame culture" philosophy by limiting the exposure of
participating institutions to blame and penalties.
3.

Financial Considerations and Structural Implications

Again, the government's commitment is integral to the success of meaningful change at hospitals across America. It would
be almost useless to simply enact rules telling hospitals what
they can and cannot do without strong mechanisms to ensure
that hospitals obey the directives. After all, New York told hospitals what not to do, and twelve years later, hospitals continue
to openly flout the dictates. On the other hand, strong mechanisms require strong financial commitments.
Sensitivity to the financial plight of many hospitals is a fundamental issue. Many hospitals are struggling (or at least claim to
struggle) to stay afloat in the face of managed care, malpractice
lawsuits (through high malpractice insurance premiums and "defensive medicine," i.e., ordering more tests to prevent secondguessing of diagnosis and treatment), and rising costs due to
technological advances and other factors. If the federal governPublished by LAW eCommons, 2003
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ment insists upon enacting the proposed legislation as is, it
needs to continuously provide hospitals with the funds to cover
the expenses of making the changes; most notably, by hiring
more medical and ancillary staff and scheduling senior doctors
for more hours of direct supervision.
But distributing cash is not enough, as New York's story
reveals, without a meaningful mechanism to ensure that the
funding is being used for its intended purposes. In addition,
threatening hospitals with penalties for improper use of the
funds is ineffective. Therefore, Congress also should be financially committed to creating and maintaining mechanisms to insure that the changes are made, regardless of which model it
adopts.
We need to implement a strong system, but the system depends upon the strategy the government adopts. If it adopts a
strategy similar to the New York model, its agency must be afforded the means and manpower to handle effective enforcement issues as they become necessary. To this end, the
Department of Health and Human Services should establish a
sub-agency dedicated to these goals.
If, however, we implement a strategy that is more in-line with
the patient safety movement and is sensitive to the safety culture that is being implemented in a number of American hospitals, the structure should be modified. The agency still needs
means and manpower, but for different purposes-to provide
for research and incentives to develop teamwork cohesion and
other prized aspects of safety culture.
B.

Implementation

That being said, and despite funding provisions in the pending
federal bill,242 it is not at all clear that Congress wants to devote
considerable resources to implement a full-scale program to insure success. 243 Perhaps passage of the bill is designed more so
to make a symbolic statement about what the public considers
acceptable hospital practices, but results are not likely to follow. 244 Nor is it clear that the New York model offers the best

method of insuring hospital compliance, even while taking the
242. See supra note 197.
243. Indeed, Medicare is making cuts that some estimates say will cost the average
teaching hospital $43 million by 2002. See Barnard, supra note 115.
244. For a discussion of the symbolic purposes of federal legislation, see MURRAY
EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 22-72 (2d ed. 1985).
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aforementioned considerations into account. The great irony of
the Bell Regulations is that they were designed to change the
culture into one that is more humane, open, and in-line with
safety culture values. But it set about doing so by forcing the
hand of hospital administrations, which balked at many of the
underlying concepts within the bill. A similar federal bill would
reinforce wariness of the federal and state government intervention, and reinforce secretive behaviors (e.g., hiding mistakes to
avoid liability). A better approach to achieving safety culture
within hospitals is to implement strategies through the practices
of the patient safety movement.
Therefore, as suggested in the last section, the first step is to
identify the behaviors that undermine patient safety. Because a
considerable percentage of physicians disagree with the empirical evidence about the effects of residents' sleep deprivation, the
federal government should set up a blue-ribbon panel comprised of health practitioners representing America's major
medical institutions (e.g., AMA and AHA),24 5 as well as some
government officials who will determine the validity of these assertions and put the issue to rest. Thus, we keep in mind the
main concerns of hospitals, tempered with any overriding patient concerns developed through scientific studies.
Once all the problems have been identified scientifically, the
next step is to draft legislative options to eliminate those
problems. Theoretically, the hospitals will be more willing to
make changes if they are convinced that such changes will significantly reduce patient injury, which (in theory) means less exposure to liability.246 Realistically, their fear of malpractice
liability, as well as other forms of blame, runs deep, and this
must be addressed. Again, consistent with the patient safety
movement, there are a few ways of approaching this.
245. Heavy inclusion of health practitioners is consistent with the idea of reaching
across traditional boundaries to come up with good solutions. It also helps to combat
one of doctors' arguments against government regulation, which is that such regulation is enacted by politicians unfamiliar with the realities of medical practice. See
supra note 231, and accompanying text.
246. Indeed, there is some evidence that the actual amount of physician negligence does not correlate well with malpractice lawsuits. A group of researchers came
to this conclusion after examining 30,000 randomly-sampled records from fifty-one
hospitals, conducted 2,500 patient interviews, surveyed 1000 doctors, and reviewed
insurance company files for 70,000 medical malpractice claims in New York over a
fourteen-year period. The researchers concluded that negligent injuries resulting in
malpractice lawsuits under-represent actual negligence injuries by a ratio of one to
7.5, and only one-half of these filed claims result in compensation to the patients.
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The first approach is to get rid of penalties by adopting incentives to comply with the directives. Congress could earmark extra money for research grants and distribute those monies to
hospitals able to demonstrate good-faith compliance with the
regulations. We could earmark special monies (i.e., research
funds) that we distribute to the hospitals that provide paper documentation of compliance by setting up schedules that limit
residents' hours to statutory limits and require enough senior
physicians to be on call or on duty. We should also, deviating
from New York's approach, require hospitals each year to provide a budget that shows how the implementation funds were
spent. This would provide the appropriate amount of resources
and also hold hospitals accountable. It would also eliminate the
fines that for some reason seem unavoidable to hospitals, and
provide funding for things such as ancillary staffing.
The second approach is to address malpractice liability in a
manner that keeps doctors at the table. This could mean curtailing, or disallowing, private enforcement of the statute's contents and/or use of such contents in a malpractice lawsuit (i.e.,
closing the door to Thomas Moore's suggestion, as discussed
earlier).247 The idea is not to punish retrospectively, but to improve prospectively.
There is reason to believe that doctors would be receptive to
endeavors that embody safety culture features and avoid blame
culture features. For instance, many hospitals and doctors supported the federal legislation for voluntary and anonymous reporting of medical errors, which was designed to pinpoint
problems and find solutions. 248 Although those measures never
came up for a vote, the time seems ripe to carry through with
the early patient safety movement by way of a thoughtful investigation of, and putting into action solutions to, the sleepy resident problem. If the federal government sees fit to make
serious changes to health care delivery, this might be a good
compromise to get hospitals to comply and actively participate.
This proposal does not provide specifics on the regulations'
content because hospitals and the government must get on the
same page in defining the problems. All the details can be
worked out thereafter. Such implementation allows the federal
government (and possibly interested state governments) to work
with hospitals, not against them.
247.
248.

See supra notes 171 and 239, and accompanying text.
See supra note 192, and accompanying text.
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VI.

73

CONCLUSION

The problem of the sleepy, unsupervised resident presents
troubling implications for the quality of health care in America.
However, New York's experience demonstrates that blind demands on the medical establishment are not productive of
meaningful change in the system. Instead, a better approach
works within hospital culture by first understanding it, retaining
the valuable parts, and working to eradicate the destructive
parts. Eradication should proceed through positive means that
encourage cooperative efforts to change the culture, as well as
the law.
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